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Abstract
Functional Security Testing can be used to assure that the security func-
tionality of a system works as specified. Thereby the focus lies not on a
malicious breakup of a system, but on achieving assurance that its specified
functionality can be trusted. In this work we present an approach for orga-
nizing and conducting functional security tests. It can be used to perform
such tests for various systems and security requirements. Furthermore, it is
highly flexible and extendable, which allows it to be adapted to the specific
needs of an organization and its systems. To show the basic practicability
of the theoretical concepts we present, rudimentary test data are created for
the developed approach. The test data is necessary to make the theoretical
concepts feasible in practice. The approach includes a structure which pro-
vides guidance for its enrichment through the development of quantitative
test data. This is considered as a necessity due to the criticality of this task.
To evaluate the correctness and practical applicability of the approach a val-
idation is shown. The presented validation is threefold. At the beginning, we
validate the theoretical concepts in respect to there common criteria [ISO07]
conformance and compliance to other relevant standards and best practices.
Subsequently, we indicate the completeness of the test cases by performing
a coverage assessment. Finally, we validate the applicability of the approach
in a real-life project.
Summarized it can be said that this work provides a holistic treatment of
functional security testing and provides a flexible and extendable approach
for performing and organizing functional security tests.
v
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Chapter 1
Motivation
Information systems are an integrated and indispensable component of al-
most every organization. Consequently, the security of these systems and
as a result, the security of the whole business have become an important
factor. Information (in)security has become so important that it can, in an
extreme case, put an organization out of business. This can happen when the
security does not meet the given legal requirements, or when the trust of the
business partners is lost due to a security breach. Both can be affected by
software security related issues, which are further described in [McG06].
That is why there must be clearly defined security requirements and why
they must be fulfilled by an information system. Especially functional secu-
rity requirements, detailing the non-functional requirements (see chapter 3)
towards security from system engineering, play a major role when it comes
to security assurance. Hence the security expectations of a system must be
codified through security requirements. These security requirements have to
be functionally tested to show the system’s compliance to them.
Functional testing cannot be used to show the overall security of the whole
system, as testing per se does not allow this for large systems [Dij70]. How-
ever, it can be used to get an indication that the functional requirements are
met. In contrast to penetration testing, functional testing is not utilized to
compromise or break a system, but rather to show that the security safe-
guards adhere to the functional security requirements. The fulfillment of
functional security requirements is the area on which this thesis is focused.
The target audience this thesis aims at are mainly software- and secu-
rity engineers, but it can also be valuable for more business-oriented per-
sons, which want or have to know more about how to improve the security
of software. As this thesis is written in cooperation with an internationally
operating company, it has strong relevance to problems and threats global
organizations face. However, it is based on academic pillars which are used
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to assure that this work is not only beneficial for the cooperating company,
but still provides valuable information for the scientific community.
1.1 The research question
The research question, which we investigate in this work aims at functional
security tests and their utilization for testing security requirements.
In this thesis we will show that it is possible to create a correlation be-
tween functional security tests and given security requirements, which en-
ables a direct mapping of test cases to the underlying requirements.
In course of this thesis we create an approach for functional security test-
ing based on predefined test cases, which enables a direct correlation to se-
curity requirements. Hence we construct functional security test cases which
can be used to verify and validate the functional correctness of the linked re-
quirement(s). The transition from requirements to related test cases should
be made semi-automatically. The manual execution of the test cases itself is
assigned to the tester, as fully-automatic tests are outside the scope of this
work.
To measure the quality of the approach, parts of the Common Criteria,
as defined in [ISO07], are taken as reference. My goal is that the approach
enables systems to fulfill the requirements for an EAL2 classification within
the testing part (Class ATE: Tests). The requirements for EAL2 are shown
in figure 1.1 by the highlighted areas. The ATE IND family is defined as
irrelevant in this case as it refers to the evaluator and not the developer. We
discuss this in more detail in section 6.1.
ATE_COV: Coverage
ATE_DPT: Depth
ATE_FUN: Functional tests
ATE_IND: Independent testing
1 2 3
1 2 3 4
1 2
1 2 3
Irrelevant
Fig. 1.1 Common Criteria, Class ATE: Tests, adapted from [ISO07]
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A further measure is the coverage of the requirements by there test cases.
The developed test data should reach a sophistication level that provides a
holistic coverage of the linked requirements.
As the practical usage of the approach is of special interest for TeliaSon-
era, the applicability of the approach should be assessed and measured in a
real project.
1.2 TeliaSonera
This thesis is a cooperation between University of Vienna and TeliaSonera.
Hence this work is shaped around processes and structures of TeliaSonera.
This results in the thesis being able to test academic ideas against real-world
requirements. Due to the opportunities given by TeliaSonera, this work is not
only limited to commonly accepted ideas and theoretical investigations, but
can also build on the latest practical knowledge provided by the researchers
of the company.
As stated in [Tel08], TeliaSonera considers itself as a global player in
telecommunication, which gives this thesis the european outlook my eras-
mus exchange stay at DSV is aimed at.
TeliaSonera is the leading telecommunications company in the Nordic and Baltic region and
also holds strong positions internationally in mobile communications in Eurasia, including
Turkey and Russia. At the end of 2006 TeliaSonera successfully launched mobile services
in Spain. We offer reliable, innovative and easy-to-use services for the transmission and
packaging of sound, images, data, information, transactions and entertainment. [Tel08]
1.3 Layout of this work
This thesis is divided into four parts. The first (chapter 2 and 3) contains
theoretical foundations of testing with a focus on security. This base is used
by the subsequent chapters ( 4 and 5) to develop an approach which satisfies
the research question of this thesis. The third part, presented in chapter 6,
validates the quality of the developed functional security testing approach.
Finally, chapter 7 summarizes the contributions of this work and presents
ideas for further research in this area. Each of the chapters is now described
in more detail to give an overview of its content.
Part 1 - Theoretical Fundamentals
In chapter 2 we give an overview of standards and best practices which in-
fluence this work. Further we discuss different testing concepts and observe
them according to their suitability for this thesis. Subsequently we give a
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short overview of a software development process. As testing is of special
interest for the further work the focus lies on how testing is related to this
process and its steps. Further the Software Development Process Lifecycle
and the Secure Development Lifecycle are shortly described to show which
role testing can play in these development processes. Subsequently an intro-
duction to testing is given which contains a description of common testing
techniques.
The next chapter (3) aims especially on security testing in contrast to test-
ing in general. We explain why security testing is different from traditional
testing and the resulting implications. Selected security testing techniques
and their differences are described. As an important cornerstone for the fur-
ther work a definition of functional security testing is given in this chapter.
We recommend this chapter, or especially the section about functional secu-
rity testing, to the reader as this definition forms an important pillar for the
rest of the work.
Part 2 - Development of the Functional Security Testing Approach
In contrast to the preparatory chapters before, this part forms the core of the
thesis. Chapter 4 shows the development of all static and dynamic aspects
of the functional security testing approach. It starts with the gathering of re-
quirements, describes the derived top level schema and leads subsequently
to executable source-code. This represents the design part of the approach
and the skeleton for the further work. To attach flesh for the developed skele-
ton, content for the approach is created. We call this quantitative enrichment,
which is described in chapter 5. As this should be continuously done dur-
ing the later usage in real-life, a process is described in chapter 4, which
structures the necessary activities and artifacts for adding new content to the
approach.
Part 3 - Validation of the Functional Security Testing Approach
In this part, which consists of chapter 6, the developed functional security
testing approach is validated against various criteria. First, the qualitative
aspect of the approach is examined by comparing it with prerequisites from
the Common Criteria [ISO07] and other relevant standards. Subsequently
the quantitative component is validated. First we discuss various methods
and finally select one of them to perform the validation. The last observed
aspect of the approach is the practical applicability for TeliaSonera. This
part is of special interest for substantiating the value of this work. Hence it
provides indispensable information about its validity.
Part 4 - Conclusion and Outlook
The last part summarizes the contributions of this thesis to the scientific
community. Further an outlook is given for future research in this area. This
outlook includes not only general further research topics connected to this
work, but also concrete ideas of how the developed approach could be ex-
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tended. We recommend this chapter to every reader who is interested in the
scientific value of this thesis or in the further extension of the developed
approach.
Appendix
The appendix consists of two parts. Appendix A contains the complete
source code for the static structure of the approach from chapter 4. In ap-
pendix B an overview of the created content for the functional security
testing approach is given. It has to be mentioned that a full extract of the
content can not be provided due to security concerns of TeliaSonera.
1.4 Methodology
The starting point for this work is the assumption that it is possible to cre-
ate a correlation between functional security tests and given security re-
quirements, which enables a direct mapping of test cases to their underly-
ing requirements. According to that we chose a deductive methodology for
creating this thesis. This enables me to start from a holistic top-level view
and then further dig deeper into the more specific problem areas. Figure 1.2
shows the creation process of this work. After an initial phase of information
gathering about testing with a special focus on security testing and relevant
standards, we compiled the theoretical foundations of this work. This is rep-
resented by chapter 2 and 3. Subsequently the requirements for a functional
security testing approach have been collected. Thereby the focus was to inte-
grate the approach into given structures and methods of TeliaSonera. Further
international standards had an impact on this task, but as some of them are
already integrated into TeliaSonera, it is nearly impossible to distinguish be-
tween the impact of environmental factors defined by TeliaSonera and the
influence of common standards and best practices. However, the require-
ments have been implemented and the functional security testing approach
has been created in chapter 4. This part represents the qualitative aspects of
this thesis. According to the developed approach we created quantitative data
in chapter 5. It has to be mentioned that in this part not only TeliaSonera’s
environmental factors played a major role, but also expert knowledge. Sub-
sequently we evaluated and validated the created qualitative and quantitative
parts in chapter 6. Finally a conclusion has been written. This includes not
only a summary of what has been done, but also related research topics and
ideas for further improving the approach in respect to TeliaSonera’s business
needs and compliance to international standards.
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1 MonthTime 2 Month 1 Month 2 Month
Standards & Best Practices
Fig. 1.2 Master Thesis Methodology
Chapter 2
Software and System Testing
In this chapter we give an overview of software and system testing. First we
discuss some standards and best practices which influence the development
of the functional security testing approach. Subsequently we describe dif-
ferent concepts of testing methods and discuss their suitability for the given
requirements. After these foundations for the thesis are explained, we give
an introduction into security testing and its relation to the development pro-
cess of a software system. First, a generic example of a simple and flexible
development process for software is presented. Due to the aim of this work
the focus lies on security issues and especially testing in this process. This is
followed by a description of methods and functions which can be included
in the development process activities to increase the security of the devel-
oped system. These two parts give an overview where in the development
process security issues have to be taken into account and which methods can
be used to increase the security level of the system. The testing part, which
starts with section 2.5, gives an introduction to different testing approaches
with a focus on their aims and fields of application. In this part we introduce
a classification model, which can be utilized to differentiate and organize
different testing approaches within a coordinate system. In the last part of
this chapter we give a short overview of a testing process.
2.1 Standards
To embed this work into commonly used practices and knowledge, some in-
ternational standards are taken into account. Subsequently we give a short
description of the used standards. Thereby the focus is not on the standards
themselves, but on their integration into this work. It has to be mentioned
that there are many other international standards available, but in respect
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to the environmental preconditions given by TeliaSonera and the scope of
this work, only the listed ones are used in this thesis. However, there are
other commonly used (national) best practices which are worth mentioning.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [NIS] has pub-
lished a series of best practices for information security, which is called NIST
Special Publication 800-xx series. The Bundesamt fu¨r Sicherheit in der In-
formationstechnik (BSI) [BSI] has issued the IT-Grundschutzhandbuch (IT-
Baseline Protection Manual) [GHB04], which is concerned about protecting
information on a basic level to build a foundation for further improvements
in information security when needed. Both best practices are popular in the
security community, but are out of scope for this work.
The subsequently discussed standards have an influence on this thesis.
Still, the primary aim of this work is to create an approach which fits to
the needs of TeliaSonera. Therefore standards are only used if they do not
compromise a sound integration. However, a lot of knowledge from a broad
range of standards is already inherent in TeliaSonera’s processes and struc-
tures. Hence, even if integration is the main factor which influences the func-
tional security testing approach, this implies also compliance to standards to
a certain degree.
2.1.1 ISO/IEC 15408 - Common Criteria
This standard is often referred to as Common Criteria [ISO07]. The main
purpose of the Common Criteria is to provide requirements for defining
security functionality of information systems and to provide assurance re-
quirements for this functionality. It is divided into three parts. Part 1 gives
an introduction into the structure and aim of the standard. Part 2 lists func-
tional components, which can be used to specify the security functionality of
a system. Part 3 lists assurance requirements. These requirements are used
to evaluate the correctness of an implemented system from various perspec-
tives. Different Evaluation Assurance Levels (EAL) from EAL1 to EAL7 are
defined. The increasing number of the level refers to an increasing demand
put on the assurance requirements of the functional components. Both, the
functional components and the assurance requirements can be combined to
create a Protection Profile (PP). This profile forms an implementation inde-
pendent specification of security functionality and assurance levels. When
evaluating a given information system according to the Common Criteria, a
Security Target (ST) is created. The ST indicates how an information system
is implemented and what (security) functionality it includes. While the PP
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describes a system in general, the ST is a concrete implementation. Hence it
is possible to create a ST according to a PP.
However, as this work is concerned about assuring the correct functional-
ity of information systems, only the third part is used. The assurance require-
ments and thus the EAL levels are utilized to specify the goal of this thesis
as discussed in section 1.1. Further it is used in the validation (chapter 6)
to evaluate if the approach can fulfill the given requirements. The other parts
of the Common Criteria are considered in this case as not relevant.
2.1.2 ISO/IEC 27002 - Code of Practice for Information Security
Management
ISO/IEC-27002 [ISO05c] evolved from ISO/IEC-17799 [ISO05a] which
further originates from BS 7799-1 [BS05a]. It includes best practices of in-
formation security management. The standard defines a checklist of security
requirements grouped into security controls. If an organizations aims to be
certified against this standard, it must fulfill the mentioned security require-
ments. In [Zuc05], a short overview of the security controls is given:
Security Policy mentions that policies provide direction and support for
information security
Security Organization describes how the internal security structure should
be organized. In addition, security for third party access and outsourcing
in general is covered
Asset classification and control deals with the classification of assets and
information. This classification should provide the basis for the protec-
tion.
Personnel security covers jobs definitions and resources. It also describes
user training to build awareness. Finally it deals with reporting obligations
for the personnel of security incident response.
Physical environmental security describes what to consider when physi-
cally securing the area, the equipment and the workplace.
Communications and operations management provides a checklist for op-
erational security, security planing, software protection, housekeeping,
network security, media handling and information exchange. It is mostly
about technical security measures.
Access Control describes how to control and monitor the access to infor-
mation. It also mentions requirements for the management of AC and the
user.
Systems development maintenance provides a checklist of important points
for developing and maintaining secure information systems.
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Business continuity management shows what a continuity plan should con-
tain.
Compliance mentions the importance of investigating and incorporating
the legal environment. It also indicates the importance of reviews and
audits. [Zuc05]
For this work some of the security controls are taken into account as they
match the scope of this thesis. The Asset classification and control is a part
which influences the functional security testing approach from the very be-
ginning, as we discuss in chapter 4. This is of special importance for this
work, as the mentioned security control is already used by TeliaSonera and
an integration into the approach facilitates an integration into TeliaSonera’s
processes. Further the Systems development maintenance control has an im-
pact on this thesis. As the approach is situated in the software and systems
development area, this category is influential during its whole creation pro-
cess. Regarding the content of this control it applies mainly for the creation
of test cases not for the the creation of the approach’s structure. However, it
is used as guideline, which we consider as relevant for this work.
As it can be seen, some of the security controls are not used for developing
the functional security testing approach. This is simply caused due to their
inapplicability for the given scope.
2.1.3 ISO/IEC 27001 - Specification for an Information Security
Management System
The security management standard ISO/IEC-27001 [ISO05b] evolved from
another security standard named BS 7799-2 [BS05b]. Further BS 7799-3
[BS06] is aligned with this ISO/IEC standard. ISO/IEC-27001 contains in-
formation about requirements for managing information security in an or-
ganization. Hence it is possible to evaluate organizations in respect to their
compliance to ISO/IEC-27001. Further this can lead to a certification against
the standard. This standard has some cross-references to ISO/IEC 27002,
which is used by TeliaSonera. A certification against ISO/IEC 27001 is cur-
rently out of scope for TeliaSonera. Hence, to avoid incompatibility with
TeliaSonera’s structures, ISO/IEC 27001 is left beside for this work. How-
ever, it is used for term definition. Still, due to the dependencies between
ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO/IEC 27002 a later integration of ISO/IEC 27001
into the approach can build on a solid base.
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2.1.4 IEEE Std 829-1998 - Software Test Documentation
The IEEE Std 829-1998 [ISO98] testing standard describes a way of docu-
menting software tests. Further it shows which documents are required for
software tests and how they are related to each other. As the organization and
management of tests is a major issue in this work, this standard is integrated.
It has to be mentioned that IEEE Std 829 is not meant to be applied without
adaption. This is further discussed in [KFN99]. Hence not the whole stan-
dard, but relevant parts of it are utilized to create a compliant data structure
for the functional security testing approach. We further discuss the use of
IEEE Std 829 for this work in section 4.3.
2.1.5 ISO/IEC 21827 - Systems Security Engineering - Capability
Maturity Model
This standard is often referred to as Systems Security Engineering Capability
Maturity Model (SSE-CMM) [Pro02], [SSE]. This maturity model can be
used to evaluate the capability of an organization to use a secure process
for developing (information) systems. Further the term maturity refers to
the quality level of the process from a security perspective. The standard
is interrelated to the Capability Maturity Model (CMM) [PCCW93], which
has evolved to the Capability Maturity Model Integration [Tea06]. The SSE-
CMM includes the Process Area (PA) 11 - Verify and Validate Security. As
the name indicates this process area is concerned about the verification and
validation of security in the development process. Therefore it includes a
list of best practices which should be applied by organizations. The overall
goals of these practices are described in [Pro02]:
• Solutions meet security requirements
• Solutions meet the customer’s operational security needs
To assure that systems meet their specified security functionality is a major
target of the functional security testing approach. To meet the appropriate
security level, the approach will use some methods provided by TeliaSonera
(see section 4.1). Hence it can be said that these goals will influence the
development of the functional security testing approach.
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2.1.6 ISO/IEC 20000 - IT Infrastructure Library
The IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL) is
a public framework that described Best Practice in IT service management. [CHR+07]
The aim of this standard is to collect best practice for IT service management
and further to provide organizations with this knowledge. Thereby the major
benefits for organizations are according to [CHR+07]:
• increased user and customer satisfaction with IT services
• improved service availability, directly leading to increased business prof-
its and revenue
• financial savings from reduced rework, lost time, improved resource man-
agement and usage
• improved time to market for new products and services
• improved decision making and optimized risk
When considering the above mentioned advantages from using ITIL, it can
be seen that this standard has a strong focus on the alignment of IT services
to the actual business needs of an organization. As information security plays
an important role in this alignment concept, the standard is considered as
relevant for this thesis. However, due to the limited scope of this work we
subsequently go deeper into the ITIL framework to find more specific best
practices which can be used in this thesis.
The latest issue currently available is ITIL version 3 [ITI08]. It contains
multiple books, where each book aims on a different part of the (holistic)
life-cycle of an IT service. These books are [CHR+07]:
• Service Strategy (SS)
• Service Design (SD)
• Service Transition (ST)
• Service Operation (SO)
• Continual Service Improvement (CSI)
These books are dependent on each other as they form the above mentioned
life-cycle for IT service management. Figure 2.1 shows these interrelations.
Subsequently we discuss relevant parts for this work according to this life-
cycle.
In the service strategy book the Service Warranty concept is defined.
There it is stated that [CHR+07]:
Service Warranty: How the service is delivered and its fitness for use in terms of availability,
capacity, continuity and security.
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As this work aims on functional security testing of information systems and
consequently of the services provided by these systems, their security and
availability is a key issue in this thesis. It has to be mentioned that the terms
availability and security are used as defined in [Bes]. This has to be taken
into account to avoid ambiguity in respect to the diverse usage of these terms
in the computer science area. However, the Service Warranty concept is in-
fluential for this work.
In the service design book two parts of special importance for this thesis
are described. These are Availability Management and Information Security
Management (ISM). The former can further be split up into two key aspects,
which are reactive activities and proactive activities. As this thesis is con-
cerned about functional testing in the pre-operational stages of information
systems, only the proactive activities are considered for the development of
the functional security testing approach. These activities include
[...] proactive planning, design, recommendation and improvement of availability. [CHR+07]
However, as already mentioned, ISM is the other key part of the service de-
sign book for this work. ISM is about managing information security from a
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strategic level to ensure that the level of security is aligned with the business
needs of an organization [Bes] [CHR+07]. This further includes activities to
assure that [CHR+07]:
• information is available and usable when required (availability)
• information is observed by or disclosed to only those who have a right to
know (confidentiality)
• information is complete, accurate and protected against unauthorized
modification (integrity)
The proper management of confidentiality, integrity and availability of infor-
mation is not only requested by this ITIL process, but also of major impor-
tance for TeliaSonera. Hence the functional security testing approach will
pay special attention to the above mentioned activities.
The service transition book is about bridging the gap between designing
a service and bringing it to operation. From this book the Service Validation
and Testing process is influential for this work. This process requires that:
All services whether in-house or bought-in will need to be tested appropriately, providing
validation that business requirements can be met in the full range of expected situations, to
the extent of agreed business risk. [CHR+07]
This thesis aims on assuring the correctness of systems, which includes the
services they provide, by testing and validating their functionality. Hence
the functional security testing approach targets on the same aim as the men-
tioned ITIL process. Hence this ITIL part influences the approach.
The service operation and continual service improvement books are situ-
ated after the service is put into operation. Hence they have no direct influ-
ence on the development of the functional security testing approach.
Summarized we observed the ITIL books and their included processes
and aims according to their suitability for this work. Thereby we discussed
influential and important aspects of these ITIL parts for the further develop-
ment of the functional security testing approach.
2.2 Verification concepts
Formal verification [Som04] is a method for assuring the correct function-
ality of a system. This approach relies on an unambiguous representation
of the system. Although this method can proof the correctness of its target
of evaluation, it needs enormous resources and is nearly impossible to per-
form due to the complexity of most systems used by TeliaSonera. Further
this concept is based on access to the algorithm, which is in most cases not
available to TeliaSonera. Another disadvantage of this verification method
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is the fact that side effects (see section 2.5) can not be found. Hence this
testing method is not suitable for achieving the target of this thesis.
The most common software and system testing methods use test cases
[Som04] which are performed against the target of evaluation. These test
cases can have various levels of detail, which reach from low level source
code based testing to high level usage tests. In this case the focus lies on high
level tests. On the one hand this is caused by the fact that TeliaSonera has
in most cases no access to the algorithm or source code of its systems. On
the other hand such high level tests are performed against already or mostly
integrated solutions, which provides the opportunity to detect side effects.
As TeliaSonera already relies on these techniques for assuring the quality
of their diverse and complex systems, it is obvious that we will use them as
well. Hence the usage of this method is suitable for the given circumstances
and fits to the aim of this work.
Statistical testing [BDG+98] can be used for assuring the quality of soft-
ware systems. It assumes that faults are distributed according to statistical
models and uses these models to describe the distribution of failures and
variations of a system in respect to its specification. Hence it relies on math-
ematics to evaluate the quality of its targets. TeliaSonera does currently not
use this testing concept. As this approach aims on a sound integration into
TeliaSonera’s practices, the use of this testing method is out of question.
However, statistical methods would be only of limited use for functional
security tests, which are discussed in chapter 3.
Summarized we discussed some testing methods. Further we chose the
most suitable for the integration into TeliaSonera and the given require-
ments. Hence only this testing method is considered in the further parts of
this work. It has to be mentioned that the above discussed verification con-
cepts represent only some commonly used and popular ones. Hence there
are more verification methods available, but due to the scope of this work
and environmental prerequisites determined by TeliaSonera, we treated only
the listed ones.
2.3 The Software Development Life Cycle
The use of a process, often referred to as Software Development Life Cy-
cle (SDLC), is a widely accepted and deployed approach to create software.
This is not only manifest within academic literature, but as well accepted
by companies that have implemented such processes in their organizational
structures. The activities which are involved in the SDLC can differ depen-
dent on the implementation. However, the underlying intention to establish a
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process for the development of software systems, can be considered as sim-
ilar. Agile Processes, as described in [Som04], are not further mentioned
due to the scope of this work. Figure 2.2 shows a waterfall model of such
a SDLC. This process should not be seen as the only existing one, but as
a representative example. It contains generic top level activities that can be
found in nearly every SDLC as explained in [McG06] or [Som04]. This is
regardless of the implementation even if it is a waterfall, spiral or proto-
typing approach, which are further described in [Som04]. Due to the fact
that the aim of this work is on functional security testing, the figure shows
the Scope and Depth of testing according to SDLC activities. These terms
are further explained in section 2.5. Following the activities are explained
in more detail.
Requirements 
definition
System and 
Software design
Implementation
and
unit testing
Integration and
system testing
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Fig. 2.2 The Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC), adapted from [Som04]
Requirements
At the beginning of the process the requirements for the system are col-
lected and evaluated. During this step not only functional- or security-, but
also non-functional requirements, as the latency time of the system or the us-
ability should be specified. Security requirements can be seen as functional
or non-functional dependent on the point of view. Due to the orientation
of this work the focus lies on functional requirements which are defined in
[Som04] as followed:
These are statements of services the system should provide, how the system should react to
particular inputs and how the system should behave in particular situations. [Som04]
Although it is possible to describe requirements through an unstructured
method, it is beneficial for deriving test cases when the given requirements
are captured through a (semi-) formal and structured method. This need can
be satisfied by the use of Use Case Diagrams that are part of the UML Stan-
dard, which is defined in [OMG07], or any other exchange format. When
using such a method it is indispensable that it is understood by all involved
parties within the process, which can get in touch with the requirements. The
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more detailed the requirements are elaborated the less ambiguity remains,
but the more resources are needed for this step. With a focus on security
testing, requirements are valuable as they can be utilized to derive useful
test cases with a black box view of the system. This is further explained in
section 2.5. These requirements gain value for the derivation of test cases
the more detailed they are as later described in section 3.3 through an ex-
ample.
Design
During the design step in the SDLC the requirements are transfered into a
system design, which describes the system from a technical point of view.
The design includes the system architecture and specifications about the
boundaries or internal system behavior [Som04]. The development of the
design can be seen as critical for the process as undetected failures or prob-
lems at this step have a significant impact on the information system. As
explained in [McG06] undiscovered design failures represent about 50 per-
cent of all security faults and lead to a cost and time consuming redesign in
later activities in the SDLC. Due to that test cases, which are derived from
the design, are important to discover these failures and reduce costs due to
in-security. The created artifacts in the design step are mostly different kinds
of diagrams, where UML and its specified design methods can be used for
most purposes [OMG07]. Due to the higher level of detail of the specifi-
cation, the design artifacts provide a solid base for deriving test cases with
a stronger internal focus than the test cases derived from the requirements.
This focus change can be seen in figure 2.2. Such tests are called Gray Box
Tests and are further described in section 2.5.
Implementation and unit testing
The implementation step transfers the designed system into executable code
according to its specifications. Dependent on the level of detail of the de-
sign, different potential risks can be identified. The risks can reach from
an implementation bug, like the use of a wrong variable or operation, till
a wrong design assumption. Such a wrong design assumption can happen
due to incompleteness of the design specification or misunderstood design.
Tests can be used to validate and verify the created system components for a
given situation. The focus of tests at this level is on the internal structure and
behavior of the generated artefacts. This testing approach, with its internal
focus, is also called White Box Testing, as further described in section 2.5.
Integration and system testing
During the integration step the system is installed into its working environ-
ment. When the integration of the system is finished, it can be used for its
designated purpose. As all components are coming together the system can
be tested as a whole. Due to the integration environmental aspects gain im-
portance for the system and environmental dependent side-effects become
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effective. To test a system including its environment Black Box Tests are
used. As shown in figure 2.2, these tests have a more holistic view on the
system than the partial tests during the implementation step.
Operation and maintenance
The operation and maintenance of the system is usually the longest time
period within the SDCL. During this step the system is used to satisfy the
need that initially triggered the process. This step does not only include the
operation itself, but also the improvement of the system [Som04]. This im-
provement can include the correction of system failures and the adaption
to a new environment or changing requirements. Testing at this point has a
strong external-, black box view which takes the entire system into account.
At this point Regression Testing plays a major role, as we further discuss in
section 3.4.
2.4 The Secure Development Life Cycle
A problem of the approach in section 2.3 is that security issues often play
only a minor role. They are mostly seen as cost drivers with an insurance
character, as described in [McG06], rather than as a business enabler, which
is explained in [Zuc04]. The insufficiency of security as an explicit and
important factor within this process has led to the idea of involving differ-
ent security approaches and methods during the SDCL. The involvement
of explicit security related activities consequently transforms the Software
Development Life Cycle into the Secure Development Life Cycle (SDL)
[McG06]. As mentioned in [HL02] it is necessary to incorporate these meth-
ods into the process, rather than to add security as a feature in the end of the
lifecycle. Figure 2.3 shows a graphical representation of the SDL with its
touch points for security mechanisms. The showed activities do not exactly
correspond with the steps of the SDLC. This shows that the transformation
of the SDLC into the SDL can not be seen as static and formal process, as
there are many different SDLC process implementations. The advantage of
this loosening from a direct and formal transfer method is the generic appli-
cability of the presented methods within the different steps.
Requirements
Typical requirements specify how a system should behave. From a security
point of view it can be assumed that someone who wants to break a sys-
tem does not behave like a normal user, who utilizes it without a malicious
intend. This lack in the specification can lead to unmeant and risky system
behavior that can be used to compromise the system. According to [Bis03]
Abuse Cases can be utilized to formally capture this kind of not wanted sys-
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tem behavior. A further description of abuse cases is given in chapter 3.1.
The facing of risks through abuse cases can be used for creating awareness
for security problems, but they are an insufficient base for testing. It is neces-
sary to take a closer look on each risk and assess it to get the opportunity for
an expediently rating. This leads to the need for a Risk Analysis, as further
described in [McG06]. The risk analysis provides the opportunity to rank
identified risks and address them differently. This is necessary due to the
limited resources that makes it nearly impossible to pay the same attention
to all risks. According to the importance of the identified risks tests can be
based on specified requirements which address the risks. For example if the
risk of violation of the stored data confidentiality within a system is consid-
ered as important, test cases can focus on the requirements which assure the
confidentiality of the stored data.
Design
As described in section 2.3 the design phase transforms the requirements
into a technical concept. According to [Bis03] design flaws comprehend
about 50 percent of all security problems, why security has to be exceedingly
kept in mind during this step. To mitigate security related problems during
this step it is necessary to keep the ideas of the above described risk analysis
in mind and map them to the needs of this activity. This action is described in
[McG06] as Architectural Risk Analysis. In comparison to the risk analysis
made during the requirements engineering, which had a focus on general top
level risks, the risk analysis during this step has a focus on more concrete
and technical risks. These identified risks can be used as base for what to test
for. This enables a risk driven selection of testing areas for a system. These
tests are according to the more technical risks soever more technical.
Test Plans
This activity refers in combination with the next step to the Implementa-
tion and Unit Test part of the SDLC. Due to the identified risks and their
mitigation in the precedent steps Risk Based Security Testing helps to ap-
prove if this mitigation strategy is successful for given cases [McG06]. The
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tests should take all defined requirements and anti requirements (further ex-
plained in section 3.1), into account. Compared to later life cycle testing,
the tests in this step refer to units or modules of a system instead of the entire
system. According to [Dij70] a minimization of the probability of failures
in parts of a system has a positive impact on the likelihood of failures in the
whole system. Hence the security is increased. It has to be mentioned that
the tests on this level can not be taken as an approval for the fulfillment of
requirements of the integrated and working system. This is caused by the
fact that failures may occur due to integration aspects.
Implementation
As previously explained this activity is part of the Implementation and Unit
Test step in the SDLC. During the implementation many failures can occur
due to the call of unsafe methods or the wrong use of language constructs.
Code Review and Static Analysis can be utilized to screen the code to iden-
tify and solve such failures [CW07]. In combination with the above men-
tioned Architectural Risk Analysis, the code review takes care about most
bugs and flaws during the development of a software system. The code re-
view is not a check for correctness of the code in regard to the language
specification, which is done by the compiler or other interpreters. This re-
quirement must at least be fulfilled to meet the premises for the review. The
mentioned method analyses the code for misuse of the language within its
specification. Static analysis itself can be seen as kind of a testing method
where the knowledge database about the known flaws and bugs contains the
test cases which are matched against the source code. These tests are focused
on internal system details and mostly conducted through semi-automatic
tools. An example for such a tool can be found in [FSI].
Tests
In reference to the SDLC it has to be mentioned that this step refers to the
Integration and System Testing activity. The execution of tests and the ob-
servation of the according results at this late part of the development process
forms the possibility to assure the quality and functional correctness of the
system in its real environment. In comparison to the tests executed during
the test plans step, this tests focus on the integration and interaction of the
system with its environment. The aim is to ensure that the system behaves
as intended. The early specified top level requirements can be used to create
the test cases, as it is possible during the test plans step. A testing method
which is often utilized during this step is Penetration Testing [McG06].
This method is further explained in section 3.2.
Feedback from the field
At this point the software is already shipped to the customer and works in
its environment, which refers to the Operation and Maintenance activity
of the SDLC. Typically security enhancements of the systems are now only
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done reactive to discovered vulnerabilities. Mostly patches are used to solve
these problems. Due to the fact that built in software security does not play a
major role in most current systems, many security tasks are delegated to the
environment and other systems. These systems can be for example firewalls
or intrusion detection systems. This is just reactive as it is an attempt to make
a system secure due to the control of interactions with its environment, even
though it would be better if the system itself is designed and implemented as
internally secure from the bottom up [McG06]. Due to these facts security
issues must be mentioned from the very first beginning of the development
process until its end.
2.5 Testing
Testing aims to verify the behavior of a system for certain, predefined test
cases. Due to the strong dependence on given cases, testing can never be
used to demonstrate the total correctness of a system. Edsger W. Dijkstra
says in [Dij70]:
Program testing can be used to show the presence of bugs, but never to show their absence!
[Dij70]
This quote clearly defines the limitation of security for assurance of testing.
As shown in figure 2.4, the implementation of a system and its require-
ments can be viewed as two different parts, which must not be congruent.
This can be caused by an improper fulfillment of the requirements, which
are not implemented exactly as specified or intended by the creator, or if
the implementation includes effects which were not considered in advance.
The problems caused by this divergency between the requirements and the
implemented system can be categorized as followed:
• Missing or incorrect fulfillment of the requirements
• Side effects, which are not considered through the requirements
Due to the requirements it is possible to test the specification as described
above, and hence identify where the requirements are not fulfilled. A more
critical problem is latent through side effects, which can not be found
through requirements based testing methods, as they are beyond the spec-
ification. Due to the unknown and untested behavior of the observed system
in those areas, the side effects can be used by attackers to compromise the
system.
To discover both types of divergency, we present two different testing ap-
proaches. One of the testing methods is functional testing. As described in
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[McG06] or [Tho03], functional test cases can be created for specified re-
quirements and hence can indicate that those requirements are fulfilled as
specified. Functional testing can be used to examine the system and focus
on the fulfillment of the requirements. Hence it can expose missing or in-
correct functionality within the specification, as further described in section
3.3. The other testing approach is penetration testing, which aims to find un-
specified side effects that can be used to provoke unwanted system behavior.
This is further discussed in section 3.2.
For the further work it is beneficial to categorize and classify testing ap-
proaches. The aim of testing, as shown in figure 2.4, is alone not sufficient
to classify testing methods as it pays only attention to side effects or require-
ments. To differentiate testing methods, the dimensions Scope and Depth
should be added. In this case the aim of the testing approach is a parameter
within each dimension that further specifies the testing approach according
to its focus. The dimensions have been choosen from the Common Crite-
ria [ISO07], where the ATE DPT family specifies criteria for testing. We
further describe the dimensions in the subsections.
Figure 2.5 shows how testing approaches can be arranged within this
two dimensional space. This figure is influenced by [Som04], [Jan05],
[McG06] and [ISO07]. The influence of the aim of the testing method,
which can be either related to the requirements or to the penetration of the
system, is not stated out explicitly as it can not be seen as separate dimen-
sion. This is later described in section 3.3 and 3.2. The three shown types
of testing approaches are Component Testing, Integration Testing and Sys-
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tem Testing. In the following subsections we discuss every dimension and its
meaning in detail.
2.5.1 Scope of testing
To compare testing approaches it is necessary to take their scope in respect to
the system into account. The scope has two extremes, which are the inside-
out view, where the internal construction is the starting point and an outside-
in view, where the system is seen encapsulated and only the input and output
can be evaluated. These two views of testing are also called White Box
Testing, which refers to the internal inside-out methodology and Black Box
Testing, which corresponds to the outside-in, or external view.
White Box Testing plays a major role during the SDL within the Test
Plans and Implementation step. Due to that this testing method assumes
that access to the internal system is given. This targets especially on access
to the source code. During a white box test the system is analyzed internally.
This enables the tester to use knowledge about how the system works and
operates as described in [Jan05]:
White box testing includes analyzing data flow, control flow, information flow, coding prac-
tices, and exception and error handling within the system, to test the intended and unin-
tended software behavior. [Jan05]
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The tests can not only cover cases which retrace if the implementation fol-
lows the predetermined design and architecture, but also aspects like the
proper implementation of security functionality or the quality of the code.
The level of this kind of testing is mostly modular or unit based, where
parts of a system are tested in order to approve their correctness. These tests
demand a consolidated knowledge of the tester about the system, the imple-
mentation environment and of course of security issues. As the scope is just a
categorization for tests it is possible to create and perform a test which takes
the whole system from an internal, white box point of view, into account.
Even though this is possible it is very challenging to conduct such detailed
tests for an entire and complex system. This causes the fact that tests often
have to find a balance between their scope and depth in accordance to the
limited availability of resources.
Black Box Testing follows the outside-in approach and hence does not
take the internal structure of the system into account to create the test cases
and conduct the tests. A definition of black box testing is given in [KFN99]:
[...] black box testing, in which the program is treated as a black box. You can’t see into
it. The tester (or programmer) feeds input data, observes output data, but does not know, or
pretends not to know how the program works. [KFN99]
As foundation for the analyzation of the system an exclusive outside oriented
view is considered for the test cases, which makes black box testing useful
for systems which cannot be internally analyzed due to technical or legal
limitations. Compared to the described white box tests these tests are pri-
marily performed at the end of the development life cycle against the entire
and integrated system as described in [McG06].
The distinction of black- and white box testing is only possible in the-
ory, as both contain elements of the other. The differentiation can be done
in respect to the focus of the test. This is caused by the fact that there are
different levels of detail of the internal view of a system. Not even the source
code is the representation of the real executed system because a source code
analyzation can be seen as a black box analyzation of the real executed ma-
chine code. It is not simple to draw a line where the internal white box view
ends and the external black box view begins. This differentiation problem
leads to the introduction of a new term, named Gray Box Testing. This is
further described in [Jan05]. The gray box testing approache lies between
the internal white box- and the external black box testing. Gray box testing
is an important part within the security testing area. Some security testing
approaches start with a black box view of the system and then drill deeper
into specific system details, as used in the white box analysis. Due to the re-
cently described facts pure black box or white box testing approaches hardly
exist in reality as at least some abstraction level or system detail is used for
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conducting useful tests. To make the black box- and white box classification
usable as terms during this work they cannot be seen as strict classification,
but as fuzzy ones as the gray box area itself.
2.5.2 Depth of testing
The depth dimension refers to the different levels of detail a system can be
observed on. This leads to a different usage of tests during the development
cycle according to their depth. Unit or also called component tests, which
are performed against a part of a system, are mostly utilized earlier in the
development process during the creation of artifacts. System tests aim at the
testing of the entire, holistic system in its environment and hence can be as
recently used as the system is completed.
Component testing is strongly related to white box testing and often seen
as correlating testing approach, as mentioned in [Som04]. System testing
on the other hand is related to black box testing, as the system is seen as
a monolithic and homogenous one. As the separation of testing approaches
within the scope dimension the separation on this axis can also not be seen
as straight. Due to this, the term Module testing is used, which aims on the
fuzzy border between the extremes of the dimension.
2.5.3 The software testing process
Testing can not be seen as a single action, as it is a process that contains mul-
tiple activities and artifacts. Figure 2.6 shows a top level view of a process
which states out how testing can be structured. The initial step in the process
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with test
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Artefacts
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Fig. 2.6 The Software Testing process, adapted from [Som04]
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is the creation of a test plan, where the further testing activities are organized
and determined. During the second step test cases are created. These cases
cover the system that has to be tested. As not explicitly mentioned in figure
2.6, the development and design of test cases should be driven by a risk anal-
ysis and a general testing strategy [Jan05]. Due to the kind of the created
test, different methods to perform the analyzation are taken into account.
These methods can be determined due to the different placement within the
above described dimensions and due to the aim which is described by the
additional parameter as mentioned earlier in this chapter. The created cases
should further include facts like preconditions, inputs, results and the pro-
cess of how to perform them, as described in [Jan05]. They should provide a
source for the Test data, which have to be prepared in the next step. When the
test data are created the test cases can be conducted. This leads to the Test
results. These results are further interpreted and compared in a report ac-
cording to their expected results, as earlier defined in the process by the test
cases. According to that the Test report is created, which is analyzed accord-
ing to its impact on the development process. The testing process presented
in figure 2.6 has a lack of completeness, as the influence of the analyzation
on the development cycle is not shown explicitly. However, it has to be men-
tioned that the analyzation, especially if it states out unwanted behavior of
the system, has to be taken into account for the development cycle.
Chapter 3
System Security Testing
This chapter gives an overview of security testing methods for software
based systems and describes the reasons for differentiating between security-
and traditional system testing. The first section describes which differen-
tiation criteria can be taken into account to distinguish between security-
and other types of failures. As it is shown in section 3.1 these different
types of failures have a different impact on the system. Hence different test-
ing methods are needed and a differentiation between security and tradi-
tional testing methods is necessary. Following a substantiation for the im-
portance of security testing is given. Due to that security testing approaches
must be different than traditional testing approaches. After this delineation
from traditional testing, different kinds of security testing approaches and
their differentiation criteria are presented. At first penetration testing is de-
scribed. Based on that functional security testing, one of the core parts of this
work, is explained in detail. A definition of functional security testing and
its used methods is presented. This provides differentiation criteria between
functional- and other- security testing methods. Finaly regression testing and
its relation to functional testing is described.
3.1 Security- and Traditional Testing
Security testing is different from traditional testing, as the former has to
cope with an attacker who actively searches for vulnerabilities [WT03],
[HL02], [CJ06], [McG06], [MR05] to break a system. Normal testing in-
stead assumes a non-malicious usage of the system for its designated pur-
pose. Therefore security testing must not only assure the proper functionality
of the requirements, but also has to pay attention that not more than the spec-
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ified requirement is implemented to avoid side effects as described in section
2.5. Relating to [MR05] we find:
• Security testing, checking for negative requirements, emphasizes what an
application should not do rather than what it should do, which requires
side behavior testing
• Security requirements are ambiguous and the alternatives are hard to enu-
merate, which makes it hard to find appropriate test cases
As shown by these statements security requirements are different from tradi-
tional requirements and hence need to be treated in a special way. Still, there
is a need for assuring the functional correctness of security requirements,
which is further discussed in [Mea06]. Both points refer to the problems
of security testing. As many security requirements have no explicit related
test case it is very challenging to assure that they are fulfilled. This prob-
lem of how to test security requirements states out a difference against most
traditional requirements, which have a certain target that can be tested for.
To handle the problem of untestable security requirements Abuse Cases can
be used. As mentioned in section 2.4 within the SDL, abuse cases describe
how an attacker could try to jeopardize the system. To create this kind of
use cases the originator must have an iniquitous point of view to cover the
aspects of this method. Abuse cases can be used to specify system behavior
as described by the following quote:
In some cases, the functional requirements may also explicitly state what the system should
not do. [Som04]
These kind of specifications are often called Anti Requirements or Negative
Requirements ( [Bis03], [McG06] and [MR05]). They specify how a system
should not behave and hence create a more precise delineation of the system.
A problem with negative requirements is stated out in [MR05]:
The mapping of requirements to specific software artifacts is problematic for a requirement
such as ”no module may be susceptible to buffer overflows” [...] [MR05].
This shows the main problem of negative requirements, which is the fact
that these requirements may not occur in any part of the system. Due to that
they cannot be tested properly. Another disadvantage of this Black Listing
approach is that it is always hard to define every forbidden and unwanted
state or action a system should not accept. This generic problem of black
listing further decreases the benefit from the use of negative requirements as
a basis for testing.
However, they can still have a positive impact on the security of a system.
As further described in [MR05] these negative requirements can be taken
to explicitly show risks and problems. This leads to the opportunity of di-
rectly addressing them through positive requirements. The quoted negative
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requirement can lead to a positive requirement that specifies that all input
data must be checked properly with attention to their length and content, as
wrong and unchecked input data are one major cause for buffer overflows
[McG06]. Although if some information gets lost during the transformation
from a negative to a positive requirement, it can be used to create awareness
for the risk and hence mitigate it as good as possible. Another advantage
of anti requirements is that they can be specified early in the development
process. This makes it easy and cost saving to take them into account for
deriving test cases.
Security requirements, which are specified to protect the system from
threats, build a good source for the creation of negative requirements as their
malfunction and abuse by attackers can be directly transformed into them.
Due to the explicit description of the problem it is possible to include it in
the testing process and hence establish a higher level of security. The com-
bination of both types of requirements makes it possible to set up a more
precise top level specification for systems that can be used as a base for the
further development process.
Summarized it is clear that negative requirements can help to create a
more precise and secure description of the requirements for the whole sys-
tem, but only the awareness of a risk does not consequently lead to its suc-
cessful mitigation. Hence security tests are needed.
3.2 Penetration Testing
Penetration Testing is a testing method, which targets at the breakup of a
system. To achieve that, the system is regarded from an attackers point of
view with a malicious intend. An overview of methods, which are used for
this kind of testing, is given in [HM04]. This testing approach cannot be
used to assure that the security functionality of a system behaves as speci-
fied, but to conduct tests with an aim as explained in [vW07]:
[...] ”penetration testing” refers to testing the security of a computer system and/or software
application by attempting to compromise its security, and in particular the security of the
underlying operating system and network component configurations. [vW07]
The detection of faults and defects, as further mentioned in [Som04], is the
primary concern of this testing approach. According to figure 2.4 penetra-
tion testing focus on the side effects of an implementation, rather than the
requirements. Figure 3.1 shows how penetration testing is situated in re-
lation to the implementation and requirements of a system. In comparison
to later described functional testing it only takes parts of the system into ac-
count. Within these parts it aims on deeper inquiries for possible side effects.
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Due to that this testing approach is able to discover more side effects than
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Fig. 3.1 The aim of penetration Testing, adapted from [Tho03]
the later described functional security testing. Hence this testing approach
compromises the system by the exploitation of unknown and unwanted be-
havior. To discover such side effects the requirements can not be utilized as
input, but a malicious intend must be used to derive the tests for this testing
approach. As mentioned in [vW07] penetration tests are often conducted
through the support of tools that help to compromise a system. This tools
have only an external view of the system. When a potential vulnerability is
detected the part of the system which is affected is examined in more de-
tail. This is usually done by reverse engineering and de-compilation which
reproduces the source code or any other more detailed representation of the
executed part [HM04]. Hence this provides a closer examination and makes
the system behavior comprehensible. Due to that new opportunities to com-
promise the system are gradually widened.
This leads to the problem that a penetration test only points out the dis-
covered faults and can not directly address the source of problems within a
system. This would require a more internal and holistic orientation as ex-
plained in [vW07]. It must also be mentioned that penetration tests are,
according to [McG06], mainly used as late life cycle tests. Hence they are
not as cost efficient as earlier life cycle tests [MR05].
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3.3 Functional Security Testing
Functional Security Testing, which is addressed during this section, can be
used to assure that security functionality behaves as specified by the require-
ments. A definition of security testing is given in [PM04]:
Thus security testing must necessarily involve two diverse approaches:
1. testing security mechanisms to ensure that their functionality is properly implemented,
and
2. performing risk-based security testing motivated by understanding and simulating the
attacker’s approach
This definition for security testing can be seen as too extensive and fuzzy
when it comes down to functional security testing. Due to that a more de-
tailed and focused definition is given in a following subsection. Meanwhile
the shown definition can be used.
Functional security tests can approve the correct implementation and ful-
fillment of specified requirements, as shown in figure 3.2. According to the
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Fig. 3.2 The aim of functional Testing, adapted from [Tho03]
previously in this work described aim of a testing approach in figure 2.4,
figure 3.2 extends the aim through the influence of functional testing. It can
be seen in the graphical representation of functional security testing, that
this testing method targets on the requirements of a system. In comparison
to penetration testing, the aim of functional testing is on specified require-
ments and slightly beyond them. This slight extension of the focus from
pure requirements is caused by two reasons. On the one hand it is beneficial
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due to the fact that this provides to catch the low hanging fruits of discover-
ing simple side effects. On the other hand it is necessary trough the mostly
insufficient description of security requirements by their specification. An
exclusive orientation on the given functional requirements specification for
deriving functional test cases is questionable and not useful in most cases.
This is caused by the fact that requirements are often not as exact described
as they must be for directly deriving test cases from them. Due to that they
need to be put into context in which they need to be interpreted. For example
the requirement for an user authentication is often specified as followed:
• Users should be authenticated through a login
This requirement would not be very useful if a test is strictly derived from the
given information, as nothing is stated out neither about wrong or missing
inputs, nor about the behavior of the system in case of failure. A correct
specification of such a requirement is given in [Tel02]:
• Users should be authenticated through a login
• Login (correct username, correct password)→ success
• Login (wrong username, wrong password)→ failure
• Login (wrong username, correct password)→ failure
• Login (correct username, wrong password)→ failure
• Error messages for unsuccessful logins should be created
• Respond time for successful versus all types of unsuccessful logins should
be checked
• Transfered data during login process must be encrypted
• Automatic logout after a certain (idle) time
• No default users and passwords should exist
This complex expansion of the requirement has to be made to specify only
typical and common expected behavior from an authentication mechanism.
If some extra behavior, as for example the check of a password change mech-
anism or a strength verification for passwords is wanted, the list has to be
extended. It can be seen that an expansion of requirements as even described
is uncommon and unrealistic to expect during the requirements engineering.
Functional test cases have to pay attention to this fact. Due to that it is nec-
essary that during the creation of the test cases, the actual requirements must
be interpreted within their context. Hence the extended requirements are
taken to derive the test cases and their testing procedures. Negative require-
ments, as earlier described during this chapter, play an important role for
functional tests and can be transformed into positive ones. This has already
been demonstrated during this work in section 3.1. According to this, the
positive requirements can be extended and described as mentioned above.
Another important point, which has to be mentioned, is the use of functional
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testing within the development process. Compared to penetration testing and
according to [McG06], functional testing has often a more internal view and
is due to that conducted earlier within the life cycle. To conduct functional
security tests several techniques exist, where the most useful are described
in the next subsection.
3.3.1 Functional Security Testing Techniques
In [TT07] some testing techniques, which are relevant for functional secu-
rity testing, are presented. In contrast to the list of techniques in [MR05] and
[Per91], this list has already been checked for their relevance and suitability
for functional security tests [TT07]:
Requirements-based testing
This technique takes the requirements of a system into account and derives
test cases through them. It enables the coverage of specified functionality
and is useful as technique to assure that the requirements of a system are
fulfilled.
Equivalence partitioning
Systems have often inputs which are treated the same, as for example the
purchase of a CD or a DVD within a shopping system. When utilizing the
equivalence partitioning technique multiple test cases are derived for each
of these partitions. This includes valid or invalid input as further mentioned
in [TT07].
Boundary value analysis
This testing technique refers to the test of a systems behavior when it is
pushed to its boundaries. Suitable test cases for this technique examine the
behavior of the system at its boundaries and slightly around them. This is
caused due to the fact that boundary cases often discover unintended behav-
ior as described in [CJ06].
Robustness and fault tolerance testing
This technique aims to test the behavior of a system far beyond its bound-
aries. A standard example for this is the use of long or oversized inputs to
cause a buffer overflow as explained in [MR05].
Usage based and use-case based testing
As use cases specify how a system will be used during its operation it is
obvious that these specifications can be used as a basis to derive test cases.
For security testing especially abuse cases and negative requirements, which
were both earlier described in this chapter, play an important role when it
comes to deriving test cases through them.
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3.3.2 Definition of Functional Security Testing
As already mentioned, the above given definition of security testing can be
seen as too extensive and not specific enough for the aim of this work. As
we did not find any definition for functional security testing, one is given
now. It has to be mentioned that this definition is strongly influenced by
Albin Zuccato, a supervisor of this thesis. Functional security testing can be
defined as followed:
Functional security tests aim on testing the
• correctness of relevant spots
• and around the boarders of a requirement
• without malicious intend
In comparison to penetration testing (section 3.2), functional security
testing has its aim on requirements and only slightly beyond them. This dif-
fers from penetration testing, which has its focus on side effects and only
parts of the system, rather than the fulfillment of requirements. Another dif-
ferentiation criteria is the intend of the testing approaches. While penetration
testing has a malicious intend and aims on the breakup of a system through
compromising parts of it, functional security testing aims on the correct ful-
fillment of the system’s requirements specification. This is also expressed
through the use of the above described functional security test techniques.
Their use is implied due to the non-malicious intend of functional security
testing.
It has to be stated out that there may be of course cases where the pre-
sented definition and differentiation criteria have a lack of plain correctness,
but it has to be kept in mind that this is caused due to the fuzzy borders when
working on and beyond the edge of common accepted knowledge.
3.4 Regression Testing in Security
Regression Tests aim at the reuse of already conducted tests to assure that
the use of updates or the extension of given systems does not influence the
original and already tested functionality of the system. In [KFN99] this kind
of testing approach is defined as followed:
The term regression testing is [...] the idea of reusing old tests [...] [KFN99]
Regression testing can be seen from two different points of view, which
can be distinguished by the level of completeness in regard to the specified
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requirements of a system. According to [KFN99] the different approaches
and their included procedures can be defined as followed:
• Finding an error→ fixing it→ repeating the test that exposed the problem
in the first place
• Finding an error → fixing it → executing a standard series of tests to
make sure that the change did not disturb anything else
The first definition covers only tests for a specific part of a system, in which
a failure has been discovered or a change has been made, while the second
definition has a more holistic approach of testing. The need for regression
tests is explained in [JC83], as fewer than half of the fixes solve the problem
after a first test. Following the focus of this work, the second definition is
used.
Regression tests provide a possibility to reuse security test cases for sys-
tems which are improved and refined and therefore form new systems. This
requires the opportunity to define a classification of tests according to their
importance and coverage of requirements. Those tests can then be reused in
a regression test to assure that the refined system does not disturb the initial
functionality of the base system.
According to the aim of a testing approach as described in figure 2.4, the
regression test can be regarded as shown in figure 3.3. As it can be seen, re-
Implementation
Specification of
the original
system
Missing or incorrect
functionality Side-effect
functionality
Regression Test
Specification of
the new system
Fig. 3.3 The aim of regression Testing, adapted from [Tho03]
gression tests do not cover the complete system, as done by functional tests.
The aim lies on few critical and important parts of the entire specification,
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which are taken as representative examples for the base system. This leads
to a reduction of inevitable test cases for the new system. An important de-
cision for the creation of regression tests is the selection of representative
tests for the functionality of a system. Although this is critical and accord-
ing to [KFN99] also challenging, it has do be done for most systems due to
the large number of available tests which are necessary for an entire test of
the system. This problem could be partially solved by the use of automated
tests [DRP99], as they significantly reduce the execution time. Since this
is not the topic of this work it is not further considered here, but a detailed
discussion can be found in [KFN99].
Chapter 4
The Functional Security Testing Approach
To test a systems’ compliance with its requirements it is necessary to link
them to their test cases. Indeed this seems obvious, it is unfortunately not
trivial, as we discuss in this chapter. Requirements are frequently tested by
different test cases. Further a test case can be reused for testing a range of
requirements. Hence an approach for an unambiguous mapping between re-
quirements and test cases is needed. Such an approach should support the
testing process. It should not only pay attention to the static structure, but
also to the necessary testing activities. These two are indispensable to cap-
ture and manage the complex relationship between requirements and test
cases. The structure and the activities we propose are provided in this chap-
ter by a database and a process, which are derived according to the require-
ments for such an approach.
At first this chapter gives an overview of how security requirements can be
derived due to protection needs. As this is a common practice in TeliaSonera
it can be seen as mandatory condition for the development of the approach.
Further this refers to the asset classification security control in [ISO05c].
Following the process of the approach in respect to an existing testing pro-
cess is shown. Subsequently we introduce the necessary structure for a test
case according to [ISO98]. According to the static structure a database is
presented which is used to manage and organize test cases as well as their
related requirements. During the description of this database, incremental
steps lead to a continuous refinement of the database structure. First, the re-
quirements for the database are collected and top level entities are identified.
According to that a top level schema is developed, which pays attention to
the relationship between the identified entities and the holistic structure for
the test cases. This leads to a further refinement through the derivation of
a relational schema. The schema has its focus on the implementation of the
structure of a test case and its relations within a database. The last step during
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the creation of the database is presented by the implementation subsection.
Within this part the relational schema is transformed into executable SQL
code. The target system for this code is MySQL [MA07]. Hence attention
is payed to system specific features provided by the used system. These fea-
tures are used to enhance the quality of the created database schema. It has to
be mentioned that the presented database structure is developed with an eye
on flexibility. This is done in order to enable a long term future usage and to
provide support for rare and uncommon cases. However, it also enables the
management of a wide range of standard test cases and requirements.
Finally, we introduce a process for the creation of content for the func-
tional security testing approach. As the enrichment of the approach by quan-
titative test data is a critical success factor, we see this as a necessity to pro-
vide long-term value for TeliaSonera.
4.1 TeliaSonera’s Security Mechanism Reference Table
To structure security mechanisms and requirements within TeliaSonera the
Security Mechanism Reference Table (SMRT) is used. This table provides a
classification of mechanisms according to their qualitative and quantitative
security properties. The qualitative part refers to the kind of given protection,
while the quantitative aspect refers to the strength of provided protection by
the mechanism. The qualitative component of a mechanism is further split
up due to the C, I, and A criteria, which is further explained in [Gol06]
and [PP03]. The quantitative factor is organized in several protection levels,
which state the strength of protection. These security- or protection- levels
are further described in section 5.1. Figure 4.1 shows a simplified version of
the SMRT. It has to be mentioned that the complete table cannot be published
due to security concerns of TeliaSonera, but a hunch of how it is used is given
now.
While developing a new information system the different information
types, which are processed by it, are classified. The classification indicates
the protection need of information derived in the business domain. To trans-
late the protection need into the technical domains security requirements,
one has to use the C, I and A protection needs and find the relevant secu-
rity mechanism in the SMRT. The strength given in the business need, is
deterministic for the mechanism strength. The SMRT is closely related to
the Asset classification and control security control from ISO/IEC 27002
[ISO05c], the Verify and Validate Security process area from [Pro02] and
some ITIL best practices [CHR+07]. We already discussed these issues in
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chapter 1. Summarized it can be said that the SMRT closes the gap between
identifying protection needs and finding mechanisms to satisfy them.
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Authentication X X
Access Control X X
Data integrity transfer protection X
Data confidentiality transfer protection X
Stored data integrity X
...
Traceability X
Restoreability X
Key Management X X X
...
Security mechanism
Environment 
independent
Environment 
dependent
Table 4.1 Security Mechanism Reference Table (SMRT) [Tel07b]
As it can be seen in table 4.1, the security mechanisms are divided into
two groups, which are named Environment dependent and Environment in-
dependent. The first group contains mechanisms which have to be seen in
context of the environment a system is situated in, and the environmental
baseline protection provided due to this. The second includes mechanisms
that are not affected by environmental influences. Due to the environmen-
tal impact on the mechanisms within the first group, an identified protec-
tion need can be superseded by the environment the system is placed in.
This is the baseline protection required by the environment and leads to an
homogenous security standard in it. The Environment independent security
mechanisms group refers to mechanisms, which have to be implemented by
systems independent from the baseline protection of its environment.
The concrete usage of the SMRT is now shown in a short example. A new
information system is developed and according to its processed information
types, a protection at level 2-2-2 (C, I, A) is needed. As the system is sup-
posed to be in a network which provides environment dependent security
mechanisms at a level of 2-2-2, the environmental dependent security mech-
anisms of the system must fulfill at least this level to assure that the baseline
protection is not violated. In this case the needed level for the baseline pro-
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tection is equal to the needed level for the system itself. If there would exist
a gap, stronger security mechanism have to be used to fulfill the higher pro-
tection needs. To achieve an entire protection at level 2-2-2 for the system,
the environment independent mechanisms have to be taken into account as
well. As these mechanisms are independent from the environmental protec-
tion, other mechanisms have to be chosen to fulfill the 2-2-2 requirement. As
shown in this example, the SMRT provides a very effective but simple map-
ping between identified protection needs and security mechanisms to satisfy
them.
In order to create an approach for functional security testing that can
easily be integrated into the organizational structures and processes within
TeliaSonera, the SMRT and its underlying ideas are used during the develop-
ment. The SMRT predefines a way of how to work. Due to that it influences
the static- and dynamic- structure of the developed approach. Especially pre-
defined static data like the security levels or the categorization of security
mechanisms are heavily influenced by the SMRT (see section 5.1). It pro-
vides an easy integration into the processes and structures of TeliaSonera,
and enables the approach to built-up on practical approved and established
concepts.
4.2 The process for Functional Security Testing
When developing an approach for functional security testing it is necessary
to state out which activities of the testing process are affected and how the
current testing process is supported. Figure 4.1 shows the impact the testing
approach has on the standard testing process explained in section 2.5. The
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Fig. 4.1 Functional Security Testing Approach Process
process is covered by two different areas, which are Mechanistic and Cre-
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ative. Both refer to the kind of support for the process given by the testing
approach. The Mechanistic term is used according to an automatization level
which is mostly independent from the creative capabilities of the tester who
uses the approach in this part of the process. Hence it refers to a level of
automatization that accurately prescribes the actions which have to be per-
formed on a detailed level. The term Creative is used to show that this part
is paid attention to in the testing approach, but its conduction still needs
the creative capabilities of the tester. These capabilities are further basic
computer- and security knowledge. It has to be mentioned that even in this
areas the approach supports the tester and determines many activities. Still,
an interpretation of these instructions is needed. The idea for the separation
of coverage by the mentioned terms is taken from [Zuc05].
The aim of the testing approach is to have as much as possible automa-
tization of the testing process. According to that the Mechanistic coverage
is the preferred one. However, a full mechanistic coverage is out of scope
of this work as it would not only include the execution of tests, but also the
comparison of outcomes to its expected results, as well as an analyzation of
these generated data. Hence the gap to reach a full mechanistic coverage can
be declared as quite large when it comes to test complex and heterogeneous
systems, as it is done by TeliaSonera. Subsequently, we discuss the activities
and their related artifacts in detail.
Design test plan This activity is supported due to the semi-automatic deriva-
tion of test cases for given requirements. Hence it enables the tester to
generate the Test plan artifact. It has to be mentioned that the test plan
does not only consist of the data generated by the approach, as it would
just cover some security aspects of the testing process. In addition the Test
Coverage Assessment [Tel07d] and Security Test Plan [Tel07c] docu-
ments are used by TeliaSonera to embed the given information by the
testing approach into the holistic testing plan. This testing plan can in-
clude the need for additional tests, as for example to penetrate a system.
Further it can also require review activities.
Design test cases According to the created test plan, this activity refers to
the crafting of the test cases in order to fulfill it. The approach will pro-
vide a number of predefined test cases for given requirements, which are
based on the SMRT. Due to that the design of test cases for already tested
requirements is not necessary during the process. Hence this activity can
be declared as semi-automatical accomplishable for requirements which
are already included in the approach.
Prepare test data The preparation of test data must be performed according
to the test cases they should be used for. Due to that this activity and
thus the resulting Test data artifact are both covered by the predefined
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test cases, which are created in the previous activity. The merge of the
creation of test cases and the preparation of test data by the approach
is caused by the need for a tight relation between them to create useful
tests. A separation of these activities can be declared as non-beneficial as
the merge enables a more comprehensive view of the created test cases
and avoids weak test data, which do not actually fit to the test cases. The
utilization of weak test data can happen if the tester has a different view
on the test case and therefore would create test data which do not reflect
the creator’s idea. To mitigate this the creation of test data is merged with
the creation of the test cases. It has to be mentioned that the actual test
data must not be written into a test case, as it is in many cases more useful
to make a description of how the test data have to look like. This is caused
due to flexibility needs, as it helps to make the tests more adaptable to a
specific situation and environment. However, the description of the data
must be exact and unambiguous. Hence this activity can still be seen as
mechanistic if no new test cases have to be created.
As already mentioned the activities and artifacts are mechanistically covered
by the approach till to this point. This coverage can not be classified as full-,
but semi- automatic. To close the gap to reach a full automatic processing of
these steps it is necessary to formally specify the requirements, which feed
as input for the design of the test plan. As this can be seen on the one hand
as technical problem, it must be kept in mind that such a need, to formally
specify requirements, also includes many stakeholders and can be seen as
challenging when it comes down to heterogeneous systems as used by Telia-
Sonera. Further this leads to organizational change on the other hand. This
is out of scope of this work as one aim of the approach is to be directly
integrable into given structures and processes. However, the remaining ac-
tivities and artifacts of the process are covered in a more generic way, which
puts higher demands on the tester than the steps before. Still, the approach
supports every activity and artifact as we discuss now.
Run program with test data This activity refers to the execution of the
tests. This part of the process is not fully covered by the approach as
it does not include any techniques or information for automatically per-
forming the given test cases. Of course the test cases include information
about the testing procedure and a description of how to execute the tests,
but none of this information is supposed to be automatically executed by a
machine. As it was already described in chapter 1, this would be beyond
the scope of this work. The main cause for that is the high diversity of
requirements and test cases according to the heterogeneous systems used
by TeliaSonera and the dependency of tests on the environment. Due do
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that some adjustments to these mentioned factors have do be done when
performing this activity.
Compare results to test cases Due to the none-automatic execution of the
test cases and the not formally specified Test results, this activity can not
be fully covered. The test cases include evaluation criteria which describe
the expected results, but the comparison of the outcomes to these crite-
ria is still left to the tester. Hence the approach provides support for the
comparison conducted by humans, and consequently support for the Test
report artifact.
Analyze The created test report includes information about the tests and
their outcomes. The Analyze activity is based on this report to derive im-
portant information which further influences the top-level development
process. The approach covers this activity by providing statistical infor-
mation about the conducted tests. This statistic is about the successful
execution of tests, problems during the conduction and other directly and
indirectly relevant factors, as for example the time of execution or dura-
tion.
Summarized it can be said that the approach will support every part of the
testing process, while some steps are covered in more detail than others.
However, it has to be mentioned that even for the Mechanistic parts a tester
is needed, although they are mostly automatized and do not require a lot of
human knowledge or influence.
4.3 The structure of a Functional Security Testcase
To craft functional security test cases the standard [ISO98] is used as ref-
erence. Due to the nature of this standard, only relevant parts are taken into
account while designing security test cases. The relevant parts for test cases
within the standard are shown in figure 4.2. This figure shows three parts of
the testing standard, which are incorporated into the later described structure
of the functional security test cases. The standard is used as reference to cre-
ate a structure for the cases which is based on international agreed assump-
tions. As explained in [KFN99], the standard can not be seen as an exact
description of how a testing approach has to look like, but as a framework
for creating adapted testing approaches for individual purpose. According to
figure 4.2, the Test design Specification sums up a test case from a top level
view. This specification can include multiple test cases which are used to
test a certain feature. These test cases are represented by the Test case Spec-
ification. It represents a test case with all its inputs, outputs, environmental
needs and other attributes, which are further described in [ISO98] and later
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Test
Procedure
Specification
Test
Case
Specification
Test
Design
Specification
Fig. 4.2 Extract of the testing standard from [ISO98]
during this work in section 4.4.The Test procedure Specification contains
procedural instructions about the test case and how it should be conducted.
In this work these components are used and adapted for the design of the
database schema. It has to be mentioned that only the underlying ideas are
utilized rather than the standard is strictly implemented. This is caused due
to its holistic view and the need for adaption to functional security testing
and TeliaSonera. As we will show in this chapters the structure of the even
presented three documents is not kept straight forward due to conceptual
design reasons and the way the artifacts are used.
4.4 A database for Functional Security Testing
To manage and store a huge number of security test cases it is obvious that
a database fits to this need. The purpose of such a database is subsequently
described:
The aim is to capture security knowledge to support the testing
process as described in section 4.2.
This can be seen as the main idea and driving force for such a database. It
targets on supporting the security testing process of TeliaSonera. An useful
and sophisticated database schema for this task must fulfill the following
requirements. These requirements are mainly collected through interviews
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with my supervisor at TeliaSonera, Albin Zuccato, and best practice infor-
mation from [KFN99].
• Mapping between top level security categories and their related security
mechanisms
• Mapping between security mechanisms and their related requirements
• Mapping between requirements and their related test cases
• Different security levels must exist for different protection needs accord-
ing to the CIA criteria [Gol06], [PP03].
• It must be possible to determine the protection level of requirements and
their related test cases according to the CIA criteria.
• It must be possible to extract related test cases of a requirement for spe-
cific security levels.
• Regression levels must be included, which determine how important and
critical certain test cases are.
• It must be possible to get the related test cases of a requirement according
to a given regression level
• Test cases can be dependent on other test cases which must be executed
in advance
• Facts about conducted test cases and their success or failure must be avail-
able for statistical evaluation
• The schema must be flexible to provide long-time usage
4.4.1 Identification of entities
Due to these requirements a couple of necessary entities can be extracted.
The following top level entities are identified, but it has to be mentioned that
they do not take any special design methods into account yet.
Category The Category is used to categorize security mechanisms ac-
cording to a global view of security. Such a category can be for example
Authentication.
Mechanism Mechanism is a more concrete security mechanism which is
directly linked to a requirement. The category and the mechanism entities
also occur in the SMRT as explained in section 4.1.
Requirement The Requirement refers to a system requirement, which can
be tested during the testing activities within the development life cycle.
A requirement can be on the one hand very specific and concrete. On
the other hand it has to be mentioned that requirements, which are only
described by a top level specification, occur as well.
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Test Case A Test Case represents a functional security test case. The aim
of a test case is to capture specialized security expertise to make it avail-
able if needed. As explained above, a mapping between a requirement
and its related test cases should be enabled by the presented approach.
Security Level To determine which test cases are relevant to perform is
not possible without knowing which Security Level a certain requirement
must fulfill. The security level entity provides these security levels, to
which a requirement and a test case can refer to. This determines on which
security level a requirement is tested by a test case.
Regression Level The use of Regression Levels creates the opportunity to
assign test cases to different classes. These classes can be differentiated
by their importance. Hence this classification can be used to decide which
tests are more important than others. When it comes to projects which
suffer from a high time and cost pressure, this can be used to prioritize
tests. Further this aims on an utilization in regression tests according to
section 3.4 and should be seen as an extra feature which is directly built
in in the approach even though it is not the primary focus of the work.
Conducted Tests The last entity is called Conducted Tests and provides
an opportunity for documenting the performed activities and their results.
Further it builds the foundation for later analyzations. The collected data
can be evaluated to get statistical information about how many failures the
test cases identify, which areas are affected by a larger number of security
problems, or other important statistical evaluation criteria.
4.4.2 Top level schema
Due to the complexity of the relations between the identified top level en-
tities, the mapping of the conceptual functional security testing approach
to a database schema is not straight-forwarded and offers multiple opportu-
nities. One possible database schema is shown in figure 4.3. This schema
shows only the relation between the described top level entities and does not
include attributes or information about how relations will be implemented
within the actual database. The concrete entities including their attributes
and the technical implementation are described later in this section. The
presented schema is designed with the aim to create a highly flexible and
adaptable database. This is caused by the above described requirements. The
top level schema does not pay attention to performance issues due to the es-
timated small size of the database which would not justify to put effort in
such optimization. It can be said that current systems have enough resources
to handle it.
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Requirement TestCaseSpecification1...m
0...n
SecurityLevel
IntegrityConfidentiality Availability
AtomicTestCase
RegressionLevel
1...m
1
n
3
0...m
1...n
Dependencies
Mechanism
0...n
1...m
0...m
1...n
Dependencies
Category
0...m
1...n
ConductedTests
1...n
0...n
0...n
Common Weakness
Enumeration
0...n
1...m
0...1
Fig. 4.3 Top level database schema for the functional security testing approach
As it is shown in figure 4.3 the Category entity can have multiple related
Mechanisms and a mechanism can also belong to multiple categories. This
causes the relation between them to be stated as n:m.
The relation between a Requirement and a Mechanism is identified as
n:m. A mechanism has multiple requirements. While this is quite obvious,
it is also possible that a requirement belongs to multiple mechanisms. This
can occur when a requirement cannot be clearly assigned to a certain security
task, or when mechanisms are interrelated.
The SecurityLevel can be split up in three subtypes where every type can
determine either the level of confidentiality, integrity or availability. This
distinction between the three different security perspectives is necessary due
to the above described requirements and the need to specify a requirement
according to these security level criteria. Hence a requirement has a n:3
relation to the security level.
The TestCaseSpecification entity represents a test case. The relation be-
tween this entity and the requirement entity is n:m as a requirement needs
often more than one test case to be tested and a test case can be used in
more than one specific requirement. The test case specification itself can
have other, multiple test case specifications as dependencies. This leads to
the recursive dependency relation of the test case specification which is n:m.
As a test case specification can have multiple preconditions and a test case
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specification, which is used as a precondition, can in turn be used by multiple
other test case specifications, it is necessary to have such a relation.
The AtomicTestCase entity is used to create a hierarchy within the test
cases. Because it is useful to reuse parts of a test case to avoid redundancy
this hierarchical structure is introduced. Due to that a test case specification
can take multiple atomic test cases to form a test case and a certain atomic
test case can be used by multiple test case specifications. This leads to the us-
age of an n:m relation. The structure has been chosen with the aim to create
a flexible design as explained earlier. It is also used to avoid redundancy and
hence lead to a better database design. An atomic test case has a recursive
n:m relation, which is caused due to the need for dependencies. The reason
for that is equal to the above described one for the test case specification.
The RegressionLevel specifies the importance of a test case during a re-
gression test. As a test case under the influence of security levels and re-
quirements can only have one certain regression level and a regression level
is used by multiple test cases a 1:n relation is used.
The central point of the schema is the relation between Requirement, Se-
curity Level, TestCaseSpecification, RegressionLevel and ConductedTests.
This relation maps a requirement to its test cases, where every linkage be-
tween them has its specific regression level and security levels according to
the CIA criteria. This relation is unique. Hence one test case specification
can test multiple requirements, where every requirement can be tested on a
different security- and regression- level.
The ConductedTests entity collects statistical information about performed
tests, which can be used for a later analyzation. It has no influence on any
other relations. It is used to collect information about all performed test cases
and their results. It refers to atomic test cases as well as to the even described
multiple relationship to provide traceability for every executable part.
An additional entity, which is not derived through the given requirements
and also not further mentioned for the database design is the Common Weak-
ness Enumeration (CWE). The CWE is a collection of software weaknesses
which can be found in [MIT08b]. The integration of the entity enables a link
between a test case and a weakness it tests for, thus creating a more holistic
view of the coverage of known weaknesses by test cases. As this is outside
the scope of this work, this entity is not further used for the derivation of the
relational- and database- schema. However, it is mentioned as proposal for a
further development of the functional security testing approach.
As described there are many n:m relations between entities, which is
caused due to design aim for flexibility and adaptability, but also due to
the given complexity of the relations. This flexibility causes a responsibil-
ity shift for the meaningfulness of the inserted content from the schema to
the application or user. On the one hand this can be seen as a tradeoff for
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flexibility. On the other hand it offers a whole range of opportunities to use
it, rather than a strict database design. It has to be mentioned that data logic
and constraints are later used in this chapter to provide consistent data while
still keeping the flexibility high.
In reference to [ISO98] the presented database schema slightly changes
the proposed test case structure. However, it keeps the basic ideas. The Test
design Specification is renamed to TestCaseSpecification. The Test case
Specification and the Test procedure Specification are merged and repre-
sented by the AtomicTestCase. This merge is done due to simplification rea-
sons and is caused by the fact that no benefit is generated for this field of
application by the separation of these artifacts.
The presented top level schema gives an overview of how the test cases
and requirements are organized within the database. The principal structure
of the approach is described and according to that it is now possible to refine
it. This more detailed observation changes the focus from a generic top-level
view to the attributes and relational implementation of this structure.
4.4.3 Relational schema
According to the above described top level schema of the database it is pos-
sible to refine it and thus create a structure which can be directly mapped
to a relational database. This could be done by a simple textual relational
schema. To make it easier to understand, figure 4.4.3 presents it in a graph-
ical way, which is now further explained in this part. The graphical repre-
sentation makes the structure and its related components more obvious than
a classical textual relational schema would do. Another advantage is that it
contains more information than a classical relational schema, as for example
the used data types for attributes.
The Category table consists of a name and a description. Additional it has
a primary key, which is stated out by bold letters and uniquely identifies each
category. As every entity contains an unique identifier, this is not explicitly
mentioned for every table.The Mechanism table is similar to the category
table and contains an unique identifier and a name. To represent the mapping
between both tables, the Cat2Mech table is utilized. The Requirement table
includes a name and a description. The mapping between a category and a
requirement is represented by the Cat2Req table, which allows a multiple
(n:m) mapping between requirements and categories. It has to be mentioned
that all of these three hierarchy levels have a multiple (n:m) mapping. This
is caused by the requirement to make the relations as flexible as possible.
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Fig. 4.4 Relational schema for the functional security testing approach
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The SecurityLevel table includes a name, which gives a hunch of the
meaning of the security level. In addition it has a description, which is used
to further explain details. The SecLevel field is necessary to provide a rank-
ing between security levels according to their strength. This ranking offers
the opportunity to compare security levels and hence use them according to
the given security needs to find matching test cases. The table also includes
a type specification, which is utilized to state if a security level belongs to
the C, I or A class. As it can be seen when comparing the top level schema in
figure 4.3 with this relational one, the hierarchy of the security levels is not
transformed into a own table for each type and subtype. This is caused due
to the fact that the estimated number of security levels will be small and no
advantage is given by the use of an explicit representation of the hierarchy.
Hence the type categorization is done by the SecLevelType attribute. This
attribute contains either an C, I or A to specify the type of the security level.
The RegressionLevel table is similar to the even described security level.
It includes a name and a description as well as a RegLevel attribute. This
attribute is used to rank between different regression levels. As no hierarchi-
cal representation is necessary, no type attribute is needed in the regression
level table.
The TestCaseSpecification table includes a name and a description. Even
tough this table presents a test case it does not contain the necessary infor-
mation for the testing itself. It uses the AtomicTestCase table to keep this
information, while the specification table itself aggregates this atomic test
cases to new test cases. Due to the possible interdependency of a test case
specification to another test case specification the TCSDependency table is
used to provide a (n:m) mapping between them. This provides that a test case
specification can have multiple antecessor which have to be conducted in ad-
vance and still can be used as antecessor for other test case specifications.
The attributes Precondition and Postcondition refer to actions which have to
be performed or states that have to be reached before using a test case speci-
fication and further conducting its atomic test cases. These attributes include
no specific pre- and post conditions for the linked atomic test cases, but they
are used for more general aspects. This can be the need for user accounts on
the evaluated target system with special privileges or special software tools
which are necessary for a proper executing of the tests. However, an atomic
test case itself has further the same attributes for pre- and post- conditions,
but they have to be used differently as further described in this section.
The mapping between a requirement and its related test cases is shown by
the Req2TCS table, which represents the multiple (n:m) relationship. Due
to that a test case specification can be reused by different requirements and
a requirement can include multiple test case specifications. This relation is
not only determined by the requirement- and test case specification table.
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As it can be seen the security- and regression level plays an important role
when determining the relation between a requirement and its test case spec-
ifications. The Req2TCS table includes attributes which refer to a regression
level and different types of security levels. The RegLevel ID refers to the
regression level the requirement should be tested on by the determined test
case specification. The C, I and A attributes refer to a security level of a C, I
and A type, which was explained above. The relation between a requirement
and its test case specifications can be described as followed:
A requirement can have multiple test case specifications which
test the requirement on different security- and regression levels.
Hence a test case specification can test different requirements on
different security- and regression levels.
When regarding this table from a more technical point of view an impor-
tant point is the primary key. The relation between a requirement and its test
case specification is further determined by the security- and regression lev-
els. Hence this unique combination of a requirement, test case specification,
security- (C, I and A) and regression level is directly taken as a primary key.
Summarized it can be said that the relation between a requirement and its test
case specifications is complex and must be further determined by security-
and regression levels in order to achieve a correct and useful mapping be-
tween them.
An AtomicTestCase is a basic test case. This basic component is separated
from the real test case, which is represented by the test case specification.
This separation is caused due to reusability reasons and to avoid redundancy
within the database. The atomic test case includes the following fields, which
are taken into account according to [ISO98].
• ATC ID
• Name
• Input
• Output
• EvalCriteria
• Environment
• SpecProcReq
• ExecProcedure
• Descr
• Purpose
• Precondition
• Postcondition
• ATCType
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The ATC ID is a unique identifier which is not used to further specify the
atomic test case for humans, but for the primary key of the table. The Name
gives a short description of the test case. This is used to support humans
when creating new test case specifications from given atomic test cases and
to give a short overview of what the test case component is about.
The Input field specifies the necessary input to conduct the test case. It
has to be mentioned that this input must not be a list of concrete data sets, but
can also be an accurate description of how the input must look like. This is
caused due to a higher flexibility and a wide range of different inputs, which
can not all be treated explicitly for each system and requirement that will be
tested.
According to the input the Output is specified. This is done similar to the
input creation. The EvalCriteria attribute contains criteria which are used
to determine if the conducted test was successful. The content of this field
can be, according to the input and the output, either an accurate top level
description of the pass- or fail condition, or an exact listing of the criteria a
test has to fulfill to be counted as successful or failed.
In the Environment attribute environmental needs can be described.
These requirements include any environmental precondition or a certain en-
vironmental affected state in which a system has to be while conducting the
test. It is important to notice that other atomic test cases, which have to be
performed in advance, are not included in this field. They are represented by
an explicit table for this kind of precondition, which is later described during
this part. The SpecProcReq contains special requirements for the procedure
of performing the test case. For further explanation of these special proce-
dural requirements see [ISO98].
The Descr attribute contains a description of the test case. The aim of a
test case is stored in the Purpose data field. It gives a short explanation of
what the test case is testing for. The Precondition field is used to describe
preconditions for the test case. These preconditions are in comparison to the
Environment field not environmental. They aim at certain system or com-
ponent specific actions or prerequisite which have to be done or fulfilled
before conducting the test. The Postcondition refers to actions which have
to be performed after the test case was conducted. This can be for example
a cleanup activity.
To further specify for what kind of test an atomic test case stands for,
the ATCType attribute is used. It refers to the different functional security
test techniques presented in section 3.3. Hence this attribute can take only
several states:
• Requirement
• Equivalence
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• Boundary
• Robustness
• Usage-based
This additional classification can be seen as an extra feature. Its is especially
useful for later statistical analysis of conducted test cases and the assessment
of a requirements coverage by its test cases as later described in chapter 6.
The above mentioned fact, that an atomic test case can have multiple
atomic test cases as antecessors and such a case can also be used as pre-
condition by multiple other cases, leads to the need for a mapping table.
This mapping table is represented by ATCDependency, which is utilized to
manage these relations. A remaining part to describe in the model of figure
4.4.3 is the relation between the test case specification and the atomic test
cases. The TCS2ATC table maps multiple test case specifications to multi-
ple atomic test cases (n:m). Hence it allows the reuse of atomic test cases by
different test case specifications.
The last entity is the ConductedTests table. It stores statistical information
about the performed tests and their results. In order to achieve a flexible pos-
sibility to trace information not only about the conducted atomic test cases,
test case specifications or the tested requirements, it has relations to all these
relevant tables. This provides to store all information in just one table. Hence
complexity is reduced. As it is an extra table for additional information stor-
age, it has no influence on the structure of the presented database schema
itself, even if it has multiple relations to its tables. The attributes are not
further explained here as their names are a sufficient explanation.
During this description no attention has been payed to the used data types,
as they can vary between different relational databases. The used data types
should only be seen as hint to the kind of content for the attributes, not as
strict limitation. The additional information about the ability to leave at-
tributes empty is also only a very basic one and presents just an expedient
assumption. These recommendations are then refined and set out in the im-
plementation part. As it can be seen when regarding the holistic structure of
the presented database schema, generalization is widely used. It is utilized
to craft a logical and usable structure, which leads to a more comprehensi-
ble build-up. The core component is the Req2TCS table which includes all
relevant data for structuring the relationship between requirements and its
corresponding test cases. Summarized it can be said that this mapping table
directly refers to the aim of this thesis as it is stated out in chapter 1:
It is possible to create a correlation between functional secu-
rity tests and given security requirements, which enables a direct
mapping of test cases to their underlying requirements.
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4.4.4 Implementation
During this part the presented relational schema from subsection 4.4.3 is
transformed into executable SQL code. As there are different SQL coding
standards it has to be mentioned that the target system for the here presented
code is MySQL [MA07]. Following important decisions and assumptions
for the derivation of the SQL code through the relational schema are pre-
sented. Simple and obvious transformation details are left apart to reduce
redundancy.
The Req2TCS table as shown in listing 4.1 represents the core mapping
between requirements and its test case specifications.
Listing 4.1 Mapping between Requirements and Test Case Specifications
1 CREATE TABLE Req2TCS (
2 Req ID VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) NOT NULL,
3 TCS ID VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) NOT NULL,
4 C VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) NOT NULL,
5 I VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) NOT NULL,
6 A VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) NOT NULL,
7 RegLevel ID VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) NOT NULL,
8 PRIMARY KEY( Req ID , TCS ID , C , I , A, RegLevel ID ) ,
9 CONSTRAINT Req2TCS Req dependency FOREIGN KEY ( Req ID )
10 REFERENCES Requ i remen t ( Req ID )
11 ON UPDATE CASCADE
12 ON DELETE CASCADE,
13 CONSTRAINT Req2TCS TCS dependency FOREIGN KEY ( TCS ID )
14 REFERENCES T e s t C a s e S p e c i f i c a t i o n ( TCS ID )
15 ON UPDATE CASCADE
16 ON DELETE CASCADE,
17 CONSTRAINT Req2TCS Reg dependency FOREIGN KEY ( RegLevel ID )
18 REFERENCES R e g r e s s i o n L e v e l ( RegLevel ID )
19 ON UPDATE CASCADE
20 ON DELETE CASCADE,
21 CONSTRAINT Req2TCS C dependency FOREIGN KEY (C)
22 REFERENCES S e c u r i t y L e v e l ( SecLeve l ID )
23 ON UPDATE CASCADE
24 ON DELETE CASCADE,
25 CONSTRAINT Req2TCS I dependency FOREIGN KEY ( I )
26 REFERENCES S e c u r i t y L e v e l ( SecLeve l ID )
27 ON UPDATE CASCADE
28 ON DELETE CASCADE,
29 CONSTRAINT Req2TCS A dependency FOREIGN KEY (A)
56 4 The Functional Security Testing Approach
30 REFERENCES S e c u r i t y L e v e l ( SecLeve l ID )
31 ON UPDATE CASCADE
32 ON DELETE CASCADE
33 )ENGINE=INNODB;
To avoid failures when creating relationships in this table, constraints are
used to protect the data integrity. As it can be seen in line 8, the primary
key is created by the use of all attributes, which was already described in the
relational schema. For each of the attributes a constraint to its original table
is set (line 9, 13, 17, 21, 25, 29). This assures that a change in any key value
does not lead to a breakup of the mapping table. Another important benefit
from the constraints is that any kind of insert, update or delete inconsistency
can be avoided due to their use. This data consistency logic supports the
later insertion and management of data. Hence it leads to an easier and more
efficient usage during the life cycle.
To store atomic test cases the table in listing 4.2 is used. As it can be
seen not every attribute is mandatory. This enables a more flexible usage
of the given structure, which also provides special atomic test cases to be
stored within the database. This helps to reduce the need for workaround
procedures due to future changes. The ATCType attribute in line 14 refers to
the functional testing techniques described in section 3.3. Hence the possi-
ble input values are limited to the presented methods. This helps on the one
hand to avoid wrong, in a sense of not included or incorrect, classification of
a test case. On the other hand it prohibits inconsistency due to the avoidance
of different spelling of the same type. As this could be seen as contradic-
tion of the aim to create a flexible structure, it has to be mentioned that this
can be easily changed and extended afterwards without affecting any other
elements of the database.
Listing 4.2 Atomic Test Case
1 CREATE TABLE AtomicTes tCase (
2 ATC ID VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) PRIMARY KEY,
3 ATCName VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) NOT NULL,
4 Input TEXT,
5 Output TEXT,
6 E v a l C r i t e r i a TEXT NOT NULL,
7 Envi ronment TEXT,
8 SpecProcReq TEXT,
9 ExecProcedu re TEXT NOT NULL,
10 P r e c o n d i t i o n TEXT,
11 P o s t c o n d i t i o n TEXT,
12 Descr TEXT NOT NULL,
13 Purpose TEXT NOT NULL,
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14 ATCType ENUM( ” boundary ” , ” r e q u i r e m e n t ” , ” r o b u s t n e s s ” ,
15 ” usage−based ” , ” e q u i v a l e n c e ” ) NOT NULL
16 )ENGINE=INNODB;
The above described tables do not represent the whole database schema,
which can be found in appendix A. The missing tables, which are not further
described, are created through simple derivation from the relational schema.
It has to be mentioned that during the development of the sql schema atten-
tion has not only been paid to flexibility, but on the use of constraints and due
to that the use of data logic. This provides a flexible but nevertheless consis-
tent database. Hence it enables to meet not only current specifications, but
builds a foundation to react to changing requirements in the future.
4.5 Creating content for the functional security testing approach
To generate value for TeliaSonera due to the functional security testing ap-
proach not only its usage, but also its enrichment must be documented and
integrated in the organizational structures. The enrichment is in this case
seen as the enlargement of the approach through the addition of new con-
tent. This widens the applicability and received benefit. It does not refer
to an extension of the ideas of the approach itself. To document the devel-
opment of new content for the approach, a process fits best to capture all
included activities, artifacts and environmental needs. Figure 4.5 shows this
process.
Identify
Requirement
Classify
Requirement
Design
Test Case
Specifications
Design
Atomic Test
Cases
Requirement
Description
Test Case
Specification
Atomic Test
CasesArtefacts
Activity Flow
Requirement
Security
Level
Regression
Level
Expert
KnowledgeEnvironment
Fig. 4.5 Process for the creation of content for the functional security testing approach
Requirement identification and classification At the beginning of the pro-
cess a new requirement is identified. This requirement is then further de-
scribed to provide an integration in the given structure of categories and
58 4 The Functional Security Testing Approach
mechanisms. If the requirement cannot be added properly into the given
structure, a best-match approach should be used. This may seem ambigu-
ous, but it has to be mentioned that the process refers to the usage within
TeliaSonera. A change of the static structure would cause a number of
changes in other processes. However, it has to be mentioned that the given
static structure covers a wide range of the security area and the necessity
for adaption is of low probability. The classification of the requirement
does not only refer to the integration in the static structure, but also to
a classification according to the given security levels. Even though the
security levels are not determined until the creation of the test case spec-
ifications, they should be taken into account at this step of the process
to get a presentiment about the level of detail the further test cases must
cover the requirement and the maximum achievable security level.
Design test case specifications The test case specifications represent the
aggregated atomic test cases. As explained in this chapter, they deter-
mine the security levels a requirement can be tested on. Hence they form
the core component to constitute which protection level a requirement
provides. As tests can give a hunch about the correctness of a require-
ment and untested behavior, which includes untested security levels, can-
not be seen as assured, they determine the achievable security level of
a requirement. Regression Levels are an additional environmental factor
which affects the design of test case specifications. The specifications in-
clude information about their importance for regression tests, which must
be set in correlation to the given regression levels.
Design atomic test cases Atomic test cases form the executable tests. When
designing such tests, expertise about the requirement must be taken into
account. Due to that the environmental factor Expert Knowledge influ-
ences this activity. Further the functional testing techniques from section
3.3 are used when creating the tests. A more detailed explanation of craft-
ing atomic test cases in relation to real requirements is given in section
5.2.
Another important point which has to be mentioned is the reuse of test case
specifications and atomic test cases. When performing the process for a new
requirement, the reuse of already existing components is desirable. Through
the reuse of existing test case specifications and atomic test cases a faster and
thus more cost efficient usage of the approach can be achieved. Not only the
reuse of test case specifications for a new requirement should be taken into
account, but also the reuse of already existing atomic test cases to aggregate
new test case specifications. This enables a reduction of the amount of test
cases, which increases the simplicity while keeping the generated value by
the use of the approach on the same level.
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Summarized it can be said that the process shown in figure 4.5 is a guide
to enlarge the content base for the functional security testing approach. It
describes top level activities, as well as the generated artifacts and the re-
lation to environmental factors which must be taken into account. Thereby
the aim of the process is not to restrict the developer during the creation of
new content, but to provide a generic guideline. In section 5.2 the usage of
the process is shown to describe the creation of new content according to
example requirements.

Chapter 5
Derivation of Functional Security Test Cases
The derivation of functional security test cases is a task which does not only
include knowledge about the approach from chapter 4. It further requires
security knowledge. Thus both factors must be taken into account to perform
it sufficiently. When crafting functional security test cases it is beneficial to
keep the testing techniques mentioned in section 3.3 in mind. According to
these techniques it is possible to create various functional security test cases.
In addition the crafting process is influenced by some environmental factors,
which reach from given structural perquisites by TeliaSonera till common
security issues.
In this chapter detailed insight into the creation of content for the de-
veloped functional security testing approach is given. At the beginning the
influence of the Security Mechanism Reference Table (SMRT, see section
4.1) on the creation of content for the database from chapter 4 is shown.
Further the process for the creation of new content for the functional secu-
rity approach from section 4.5 is applied. Two representative requirements
are taken to show the crafting of test cases according to the process.
5.1 Predefined Structure
It is useful to build-up on a basic structure of categories and their related se-
curity mechanisms, when creating content for the database shown in chapter
4. As this work is related to the processes and methodologies used by Telia-
Sonera, the basic structure must follow them. Due to that the SMRT, as ex-
plained in section 4.1, is taken into account. It already had influence on the
design of the database, but also provides basic content. Hence the following
categorization for security mechanisms is mandatory:
• Authentication
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• Access Control
• Data integrity transfer protection
• Data confidentiality transfer protection
• Stored data integrity
• Traceability
• Restoreability
• Key Management
• ...
As already mentioned in section 4.1, each of the categories offers different
protection according to the C, I and A criteria. This is not further mentioned
within the static structure of the category, as it is individually determined for
each requirement and its test cases (see chapter 4). Thus enabling a more
flexible and detailed description with attention to different protection levels
provided by different requirements. These protection- or security- levels are
also predefined due to the SMRT:
• Level 0 : No protection
• Level 1 : Low/Basic protection
• Level 2 : Medium protection
• Level 3 : High protection
It has to be mentioned that Level 0 is not a real level as it only refers to the
absence of any protection mechanism. Not only the use of no security mech-
anisms, but also a missing verification of the functionality of implemented
security mechanisms leads to a classification on this level. Due to that it
is not possible to create tests for a mechanism or requirement on Level 0.
The other security levels represent increasing levels of protection according
to their increasing numbers. When protection on a certain security level is
required, a requirement which provides protection on this level has to be
implemented. To assure that a certain implemented requirement fulfills its
specification, functional security tests are used.
Further the SMRT describes mechanisms, which can be used to achieve
different security levels. However, it leaves the concrete implementation and
the used security requirement to the user. This provides a flexible usage of
the SMRT in different fields of application. The different mechanisms are
not explained here in detail, as it would go beyond the scope of this work.
Summarized it can be said that due to the use of the SMRT some content
of the database is predefined. This basic structure contains categories for
security mechanisms and protection levels. They are used to create a struc-
ture within the functional security testing database to provide a fit to the
processes of TeliaSonera.
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5.1.1 Regression Levels
The Regression Levels are an extra feature of the approach. Due to the fact
that the use of such regression levels generates benefit by nearly no extra
costs, they are incorporated in this work. The aim of regression levels is to
improve testing in case of limited resources. When not enough resources can
be allocated for conducting all necessary testing activities, regression levels
provide a classification which allows to perform at least the most critical test
cases. Without a classification of importance, it is complex to make such
decisions. As no given regression levels exist in TeliaSonera, we created
them according to the already presented security levels. The following listing
shows the defined regression levels:
• Level 0 : No classification
• Level 1 : Low importance
• Level 2 : Medium importance
• Level 3 : High importance
As it can be seen, the regression levels are divided into three stages. Similar
to the described security levels in section 5.1, Level 0 does not actually exist.
The classification of a test on this level indicates that there is no actual clas-
sification and the regression level feature is not used. Level 1 represents the
lowest level of importance. Hence tests on this level can be skipped with-
out missing to check critical functionality. Level 2 represents the medium
level of importance and includes more critical tests than Level 1. Level 3
includes the most critical tests which should be out of question to perform.
These mandatory tests include critical system functionality. Summarized it
can be said that this classification of tests is not only capable of facilitat-
ing decision making in case of limited resources. Further it can be used for
regression tests, which are described in section 3.4.
5.2 Crafting of Functional Security Test Cases
According to the above mentioned basic structure, security mechanisms and
requirements can be identified. A mechanism is a general description of se-
curity functionality, while a security requirement can be specific and de-
signed for the individual need of a system. Due to the diversity of systems
and their individual needs it is nearly impossible to list all existing security
requirements or mechanisms used by TeliaSonera. However, it is possible
to cover the most common, which provides a base for creating test cases.
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When starting to craft functional security test cases, the mentioned func-
tional security testing techniques play a major role. Expertise about the used
requirement and its functionality is indispensable for creating useful test
cases and the use of different functional security test techniques can be seen
as an indication for the coverage of a requirement by them. Hence these tech-
niques provide support for the creation of test cases. A structured overview
of identified mechanisms, requirements and their related test cases can be
found in appendix B. This list is an extract of the content of the database,
which was presented in chapter 4. It has to be mentioned that this list does
not include most of the developed content, as this is restricted information
for TeliaSonera, which cannot be published. However, it gives a hunch of
the content and its structure.
Further it has to be mentioned that at this early stage only a coverage
for common requirements is included in the database. This is also caused
due to the fact that the main focus of this work is on the development and
implementation of the approach, rather than a full coverage of a large amount
of requirements used by TeliaSonera.
Due to the number of different test cases and their requirements, a de-
tailed explanation of all of them would be beyond the scope of this work.
Hence two examples are now presented in detail. Thereby the focus lies not
on a precise explanation of implementation details, but on the process for
crafting test cases to cover the specification of a requirement (see section
4.5). The chosen examples represent two different kinds of requirements.
The one presented in subsection 5.2.1 (Standard One Factor Authentica-
tion) shows a generic requirement which does not include many technical
details about the actual implementation. The other one in subsection 5.2.2
(SSL/TLS) is specified by a strict technical standard. This diverse orientation
of requirements has an impact on the possibilities to test for their functional
correctness. Hence the test cases must pay attention to this different focus of
the requirements.
A difference between generic requirements and specific requirements is
the relation to their mechanism. As the mechanism is on the above hierarchy
level, it can contain multiple requirements. In case of a generic requirement
the mechanism often contains only one. Hence one generic requirement can
represent a whole mechanism. While the separation between requirements
and mechanism seems to lead to no benefit for generic requirements, it is
indispensable when it comes to specific requirements. Specific requirements
can be aggregated by their mechanisms, which is an necessity in regard to
the SMRT and the mapping between requirements and their test cases as
described in chapter 4.
Even tough it would be possible to create only specific- or generic re-
quirements, this would lead to an enormous number of test cases on the one
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hand, or an inapplicability of the test cases by the testers on the other. When
only specific requirements would be used, the number of requirements in
TeliaSonera would grow to an unnecessary high amount without generating
benefit. This is caused due to the different implementation details, which
must be taken into account. In case of the requirement in subsection 5.2.1
(Standard One Factor Authentication), a higher grade of detail can be seen
as unnecessary. This is further explained in this chapter. On the other hand
specific requirements can be indispensable and useful when the implemented
security functionality of a mechanism must follow a strict technical specifi-
cation. To protect transfered data over a network a VPN solution like IPSec
[IET98] or SSL/TLS [IET99] (subsection 5.2.2), which are both exact spec-
ified, can be used. As they have different approaches to achieve protection
of the confidentiality and integrity of transfered data, a generic requirement
which covers both would not sufficiently fulfill the need of supporting Telia-
Sonera’s testing process.
Summarized it can be said that requirements can differ from generic top
level- till to strict technical ones. Both are covered by the developed func-
tional security testing approach.
5.2.1 Example A - Standard One Factor Authentication
Table 5.1 shows a requirement which is part of the User Authentication
category. The related mechanism is nearly the same as the requirement, as
it can be seen as a generic requirement which has no need for a stronger
technical orientation. This is further explained in this subsection.
Name Description
Standard one factor authenti-
cation
Use of username, id, costumer number etc. and password, pin, etc.
Table 5.1 ExampleA Requirement
As it can be seen in table 5.1, the requirement is not specific. This is caused
due to the common usage of such a requirement in many systems, where
only minor functional differentiation criteria can be identified, but the actual
implementation still differs. Hence such a generic requirement can be used
in this case. In other cases, as for example the protection of data during the
transfer over a network, requirements can be more specific. This is further
discussed in the next subsection 5.2.2.
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5.2.1.1 Test Case Specifications
According to the given requirement in table 5.1, it is possible to create re-
lated test cases. Regarding the presented approach from chapter 4 the test
cases are divided into the TestCaseSpecification and the AtomicTestCase.
The specification aggregates atomic test cases, while the atomic test cases
represent the executable tests. Atomic test cases contain only as much in-
formation, as there cannot be an overlap between them. It can be said that
atomic test cases represent atomic and mutual exclusive parts of tests, which
are aggregated by the test case specification to create tests for a certain re-
quirement.
In this case it should be possible to test the requirement on different re-
gression levels. Hence the following test case specifications can be identi-
fied:
Name Description
Basic one factor authentica-
tion
Tests if the one factor (e.g. password) authentication works properly
on a basic level
Advanced one factor authen-
tication
Tests if the one factor (e.g. password) authentication works properly
on an advanced level
Table 5.2 Test Case Specifications for table 5.1
As shown in table 5.2 the requirement from table 5.1 is linked to two test
case specifications. Both aggregate atomic test cases, which is further ex-
plained during this section. Attention has to be paid to security- and regres-
sion levels at this point as they influence the test case specifications. As the
influence of the security level seems to be obvious, it is important that the
regression level is taken into account as well. Regression levels classify the
importance of a test case specification. Hence it is necessary to keep this in
mind in order to further aggregate only atomic test cases of the same impor-
tance in a test case specification. In this particular case the split into two test
case specifications is caused by the need to test the requirement on different
regression levels. An important point to mention is that the test cases should
not be too extensive or complicated, as their execution is mostly delegated
to non-security experts. Hence a balance between the sophistication and the
applicability of the test cases must be kept. In this case the two test case
specifications for the requirement show a coverage on a basic- and advanced
level. Such a separation is influenced by the need for reusable test case spec-
ifications, as they may not be used together when testing the same require-
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ment on different regression levels. The security classification according to
the given security levels is explained later in this part.
5.2.1.2 Atomic Test Cases
When creating atomic test cases for the given requirements the functional
test techniques and expert knowledge should be taken into account. While
the test techniques create a framework in which the test cases should fit in,
the expert knowledge is indispensable for creating test cases within this area.
Additional common software problems should be targeted during the cre-
ation of test cases. A collection and categorization of such weaknesses and
vulnerabilities can be found in the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)
[MIT08b] or Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP)[OWA08].
This builds a good source for the kind of required knowledge if no experts
are available. Thereby it has to be mentioned that these sources are used
without a malicious intend. The aim is to find common problems of simi-
lar systems, not to use this knowledge to break it. According to [Gol06],
[VM02], [KFN99] and [MIT08b] the following atomic test cases can be
identified:
Attribute Value
ATC ID ATC0
ATCName Generic one factor authentication test
Input Correct Username. Wrong Username. Correct Secret.
Wrong Secret
Output Login successful or forbidden
Evaluation Criteria Login was only successful with correct username and
correct secret. Meaningful error messages are given. Re-
sponds time for successful and unsuccessful logins must
be equal. Transmission during login must be encrypted
Environmental re-
quirements
Logging is enables to verify system messages. Valid ac-
count exists and is usable. Timer that can measure reac-
tion time of system.
Special Procedural
Requirements
Check error Message for unsuccessful login attempts.
Check responds time for successful versus unsuccessful
(all types) login. Record transmission (if exists).
Execution Proce-
dure
Login(correct username, correct secret). Login(wrong
username, correct secret). Login(correct username,
wrong secret. Login(wrong username, wrong secret).
Precondition
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Postcondition
Description This test assures that the authentication mechanism
works correct on a basic level and only allows correct
authorized users to access the system
Purpose Test the one factor authentication on a basic level
Type usage-based
Table 5.3: Generic one factor authentication test
Attribute Value
ATC ID ATC1
ATCName Secret change
Input Correct Username. Correct secret. Low quality secret.
High quality secret
Output Login successful or forbidden
Evaluation Criteria Only high quality and policy compliant secrets (e.g. pass-
words) are accepted. Old secret must be invalid after
successful secret change. Old secret must be kept and
new one should not be valid when intercepting the secret
change dialog. Account must be locked after a certain
number of wrong login attempts. A correct username and
secret can not be used to login to a locked account (also a
wrong one can not be used). Locked account must be ex-
plicitely enabled by the user or is automatically enabled
after a certain time
Environmental re-
quirements
Special Procedural
Requirements
Execution Proce-
dure
Login(correct username, correct secret). Try to change
secret to low quality one. Change secret to high quality
one. Try to login with old secret after secret change. Start
to change secret and intercept secret change dialog. Try to
login with new secret from the intercepted secret change
dialog. Perform several unsuccessful logins until account
is locked. Try to login with correct username and secret.
Reset locked account. Try to login with correct username
and secret
Precondition
Postcondition
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Description This test assures that the mechanism works correct in
case of wrong login attempts and weak secret changes
Purpose Test the one factor authentication on an advanced level
Type requirement
Table 5.4: Secret change
Attribute Value
ATC ID ATC2
ATCName Input boundary
Input slightly lower/shorter than lower input boundary input.
exact lower boundary input. slightly above/longer than
lower boundary input. slighty lower/shorter than upper
boundary input. exact upper boundary input. slightly
above/longer than upper boundary input
Output Mechanism behavior
Evaluation Criteria Mechanism must work as specified during the whole test
case (see evaluation criteria of other test cases for this
mechanism)
Environmental re-
quirements
Special Procedural
Requirements
Execution Proce-
dure
Test the mechanism with all input data and also its combi-
nations when multiple inputs have to be given (6 powered
X possibilities; X = number of input possibilities/fields)
Precondition
Postcondition
Description This test assures that the mechanism works correct on its
boundarys and slightly beyond/beneath them
Purpose Test the mechanism if it works correctly on its boundaries
and around them
Type boundary
Table 5.5: Input boundary
Attribute Value
ATC ID ATC7
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ATCName Authentication Robustness
Input Correct Username. Wrong Username. Correct Secret.
Wrong Secret. Special characters. Forbidden characters.
None input. Extreme long input. Vendor Username and
Secret (if exist)
Output Login successful or forbidden
Evaluation Criteria Login was only successful with correct username and
correct secret
Environmental re-
quirements
Special Procedural
Requirements
Execution Proce-
dure
Login(correct username, correct secret). Login(wrong
username, correct secret). Login(correct username,
wrong secret). Login(wrong username, wrong secret).
Also try this with special characters, forbidden charac-
ters, long input and none input (4 powered X combina-
tions; X = number of input possibilities/fields). Try the
vendor username and secret. Mix all input data as com-
binations (10 powered X; X = number of input possibili-
ties/fields)
Precondition
Postcondition
Description This test assures that the authentication mechanism does
not fail when used outside its specification
Purpose Test the authentication outside its specification
Type robustness
Table 5.6: Authentication Robustness
As it can be seen, 4 atomic test cases (table 5.3, 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6) are
used. Each of these cases aims on a different area of the requirement. This
is achieved due to the usage of diverse testing techniques. Subsequently we
give the rational for each test case.
Generic one factor authentication test (table 5.3)
This test covers the primary functionality of the requirement, which is to
restrict access to known and correct authenticated users. Even tough this test
aims on the basic functionality, it also includes coverage for some generic
security issues of such a requirement. These security relevant issues are for
example the encryption of the transmission of the login data, or the response
time of the system in case of successful or unsuccessful login attempts. This
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test can be classified as usage-based, as it is mostly based on actions and
inputs which are used during the usage for its dedicated purpose.
Secret change (table 5.4)
The change of secrets or especially passwords is important as it is a common
and security relevant task. Due to that this atomic test case covers the func-
tionality of the secret change mechanism. As it can be seen in table 5.4, it
covers not only the normal usage of the mechanism. This test includes also
more specific requirements of the mechanism, as for example the quality of
the changed password or the atomic behavior of this function. As the shown
test case is mainly influenced by the given requirements for a secret change
mechanism, it can be declared as requirement-based.
Input boundary (table 5.5)
Boundary tests aim on the boundaries of a system and the areas around them.
As the test cases have a black-box oriented view on the observed system, this
test case has its focus on the boundaries of input data. Due to that this test
case includes boundary values for the system which are used to measure the
systems behavior when pushed to its limits. It can be seen that the given test
case in table 5.5 is a generic description of how to conduct such boundary
tests. This is on the one hand caused due to the need for reusing the test
case. On the other hand the test case is still on a sophistication level which
enables even non-security aware testers to map the test case to a certain
situation. Hence the above described balance between sophistication level
and applicability of the test case is kept. Regarding the given test case it can
be classified as boundary focused.
Authentication Robustness (table 5.6)
When examining an authentication mechanism due to the above described
atomic test cases, the behavior of the mechanism for not specified situations
has not been tested yet. This is covered by the test case shown in table 5.6.
This test case aims on an area which lies beyond the system specification.
Hence it provides a hunch of the system behavior in this area. As it can be
seen the test case refers explicitly to forbidden input data as it should state
out how the system reacts to it. This is a typical robustness test, as earlier
described in section 3.3.
When comparing the recently described atomic test cases to the functional
testing techniques in section 3.3, it can be seen that nearly every testing
technique is used. The Equivalence partitioning technique is the only miss-
ing one. This is caused due to the structure of the approach. The Equivalence
partitioning technique further relies on other techniques which are used for
actually conducting the tests. For example most of the presented atomic test
cases include different partitions, such as correct password and incorrect
password, or allowed characters and forbidden characters. However, these
tests have a closer relationship to one of the other testing techniques. Hence
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it can be said that Equivalence partitioning should be seen as a top-level
technique, which relies on other techniques. Due to that it is inapplicable
at this level for many requirement. All other techniques are used by the test
cases. Still, this should never be seen as an assurance that the test cases cover
every potential fault. The comparison to the testing techniques should rather
be seen as an indication for the coverage, which gives a hunch not an assur-
ance that the requirement is tested good enough by the developed test cases.
This is further discussed in chapter 6.
5.2.1.3 Composition of Test Case Specifications
When the test case specification and the atomic test cases are created, it is
necessary to create a linkage between them. As earlier described, the test
case specification of a requirement is determined by a certain security level.
In this case two test case specifications are defined as shown in table 5.2. The
basic test case specification provides only a rough coverage of the require-
ments specification, while the advanced one aims on a higher sophistication
level. Further they aim on different regression levels. The composition of
atomic test cases according to their aggregating test case specifications is
shown in table 5.7.
Test Case Specification Atomic Test Case
Basic one factor authentication Generic one factor authentication test (table 5.3)
Advanced one factor authentication Secret change (table 5.4)
Advanced one factor authentication Boundary test (table 5.5)
Advanced one factor authentication Authentication robustness (table 5.6)
Table 5.7 Mapping between the test case specifications (table 5.2) and atomic test cases
As it can be seen, the basic test case specification consists of one atomic
test case which tests for the generic functionality of the requirement, while
the advanced test case specification contains three atomic test cases, which
aim on different parts of the requirement. Hence the correlating regression-
levels differ. The basic test case specification is on regression Level 3. This
leads to a higher probability of conduction of this test case during regression
tests compared to the advanced test case specification, as it is on regression
Level 2. This reflects the different aims of the test case specifications. The
basic one provides only an overview of the principal functionality of the
requirement, while the advanced one aims on additional security relevant
issues. The security level for both specifications can be stated as Level 1.
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This classification may seems to be too high for the basic specification, but
it has to be mentioned that both specifications have to be conducted together
to achieve this security level. A seperated execution can only be performed
when it comes to regression tests. The accomplishable security level is also
limited due to the requirement itself. In this case the maximum security level
of the given requirement is Level 1, as a higher security level would require
a more sophisticated security mechanism. This maximal achievable security
level is determined by the SMRT for each mechanism. Further it has to be
mentioned that the security levels are only achieved on the confidentiality
and integrity dimensions, as the requirement is neither in charge, nor has the
possibility to provide protection on the availability dimensions. As above
described, the requirement belongs to the User Authentication category and
according to the SMRT a requirement in this category can provide protection
only on the C and I dimensions.
Summarized it was shown how to create test case specifications and
atomic test cases according to a given requirement. It can be seen that this
is not a trivial task, which requires expertise about the requirement, related
security issues and also the functional security testing approach itself. How-
ever, the structure of the security testing approach and the presented process
from section 4.5 provide support for creating content. This enables a later
usage also by non-security experts.
5.2.2 Example B - SSL/TLS
The requirement shown in table 5.8 is part of the Data integrity transfer
protection- , as well as the Data confidentiality transfer protection category.
This is caused due to the fact that the requirement does not only provide
confidentiality, but also integrity of transfered data at the same time. As the
functional security testing approach is created with an aim on flexibility, this
fact can be represented in the database without ambiguity.
Name Description
SSL/TLS Enables encryption of data between systems
Table 5.8 ExampleB Requirement
The requirement is in comparison to the above presented requirement in sub-
section 5.2.1 more specific. It directly refers to a technical standard, which
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can be found in [IET99]. Hence, also the test cases can be more focused
than the above presented ones. However, it has to be mentioned that the tests
should be easy to conduct also by non-security experts. The feasibility is a
criteria, which should be taken into account during the whole process for the
development of test cases. Another important point is the effort, which has
to be applied, to conduct the tests. When having a strict technical specifica-
tion, it is easy to create a huge amount of test cases which cover every detail.
During the execution of this tests it comes down to the mentioned feasibility
problem. As all available resources are limited, too detailed test cases would
lead to a consumption of this resources by testing technical details instead
of covering the top level functionality of requirements. Hence a balance be-
tween the level of detail and the necessary effort to conduct these tests must
be kept.
5.2.2.1 Test Case Specifications
According to the above presented requirement in table 5.8, the following
test case specifications can be identified:
Name Description
SSL/TLS without CAC ap-
proved algorithm
Tests if the SSL implementation fulfills the technical specification
SSL/TLS with CAC ap-
proved algorithm
Tests if the SSL implementation fulfills the technical specification
Table 5.9 Test Case Specifications for table 5.8
According to [Tel07b], the requirement provides protection from Level 2 to
Level 3 (dependent on the used cryptographic algorithm). Due to that the test
case specifications are split up according to this difference in the achievable
security levels. In comparison to the two test case specifications in subsec-
tion 5.2.1, the split is caused by different security- not regression levels. The
actual achieved security- and regression levels of the specifications are later
described during this subsection. According to the process in section 4.5,
these levels have to be kept in mind at this point as they influence the later
derivation of atomic test cases.
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5.2.2.2 Atomic Test Cases
In regard to the specification ([IET99]) of the requirement presented in table
5.8, the following atomic test cases can be identified:
Attribute Value
ATC ID ATC202
ATCName SSL/TLS Transfer
Input Date (e.g text)
Output
Evaluation Criteria Data transmission must be encrypted. If transfer is ma-
nipulated during transmission it must be recognized by
receiver.
Environmental re-
quirements
Server with SSL support. Client with SSL support. Net-
work sniffer. Packet modifier (i.e. Proxy).
Special Procedural
Requirements
Record transmission
Execution Proce-
dure
Send data between client and server. Manipulate data dur-
ing transmission.
Precondition
Postcondition
Description This test assures that the SSL/TLS data transmission is
encrypted and can not be manipulated
Purpose Test SSL/TLS data encryption and integrity
Type usage-based
Table 5.10: SSL/TLS Transfer
Attribute Value
ATC ID ATC203
ATCName SSL/TLS Closed Connection Reestablishment
Input Session ID from closed SSL session, Session ID from old
but still valid SSL session
Output
Evaluation Criteria Server must reject SSL connection establishment with
closed session id or offer new connection (new session
ID or none). Server must accept reestablishment of old
but valid session with corresponding session id
Environmental re-
quirements
Server with SSL support, Client with SSL support
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Special Procedural
Requirements
Record transmission
Execution Proce-
dure
Client sends hello request with old and closed session
id to server (same chipher and compression method as
in old session). Client sends hello request with old but
valid session id to server (same chipher and compression
method as in old session).
Precondition Session foreplay recorded
Postcondition
Description This test assures that the SSL/TLS Server does not accept
the reestablishment of closed connections and can handle
the reestablishment of old but valid connections
Purpose Test SSL/TLS Server handling of closed/old connections
Type usage-based
Table 5.11: SSL/TLS Closed Connection Reestablishment
Attribute Value
ATC ID ATC204
ATCName CAC Approved algorithm
Input
Output
Evaluation Criteria The config file for the data transfer protection must only
contain secure chipher options (CAC approved) and a
minimum key-length of 128 bit (cipher independent).
Only such chiphers are accepted for the session estab-
lishment
Environmental re-
quirements
System with data transfer protection support
Special Procedural
Requirements
Execution Proce-
dure
Open config file for data transfer protection implementa-
tion
Precondition
Postcondition
Description This test assures that the data transfer protection is cor-
rectly configured
Purpose Test data transfer protection config
Type requirement
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Table 5.12: CAC Approved algorithm
Attribute Value
ATC ID ATC205
ATCName SSL/TLS Client Handshake
Input
Output
Evaluation Criteria Connection is closed on any errors (connection aborted,
timeout, wrong order of message exchange) during hand-
shake. Only strong chipers are offered by client. Min-
imum key-length of 128 bit. Server certificate must be
valid and issued by a trusted certification authority. In-
valid server certificates are not accepted. The DNS name
of the server is compared to he DNS name on the certifi-
cate. A downgrade to a less secure chipher or SSL/TLS
version is not accepted. SSL version 2 or less should not
be used.
Environmental re-
quirements
Client with SSL support, Server with SSL support
Special Procedural
Requirements
Record transmission
Execution Proce-
dure
Client starts SSL/TLS session establishment to server
with valid certificate and invalid certificate (criteria see
in EvaluationCriteria). Abort SSLT/TLS session estab-
lishment. Server sends packages during session estab-
lishment in wrong order (i.e ChangeChipherSpec before
client has sent Finished package). Client start SSL/TLS
session establishment to a server which only provides
weak chiphers (less than 128 Bit strength) or older SS-
L/TLS version than the one used by the client.
Precondition
Postcondition
Description This test assures that the SSL/TLS implementation in the
client can handle security relevant handshake parameters
properly
Purpose Test SSL/TLS client implementation correctness
Type robustness
Table 5.13: SSL/TLS Client Handshake
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Attribute Value
ATC ID ATC206
ATCName SSL/TLS Server Handshake
Input
Output
Evaluation Criteria Connection is closed on any errors (connection aborted,
timeout, wrong order of message exchange) during hand-
shake. Only strong chipers are offered by server. Min-
imum key-length of 128 bit. Server certificate must be
valid and issued by a trusted certification authority. The
DNS name of the server is equal to he DNS name on
the certificate. A downgrade to a less secure chipher or
SSL/TLS version is not accepted. SSL version 2 or less
should not be used.
Environmental re-
quirements
Server with SSL support, Client with SSL support
Special Procedural
Requirements
Record transmission
Execution Proce-
dure
Client starts SSL/TLS session. Clients aborts session dur-
ing handshake. Client starts new SSL/TLS session and
sends package in wrong order during session establish-
ment (i.e Finished package before ChangeChipherSpec).
Client with older SSL/TLS version than the one used by
the server tries to etablish a session. Client tries to nego-
tiate a weak chipher (less than 128 Bit strength) during
SSL/TLS handshake.
Precondition
Postcondition
Description This test assures that the SSL/TLS implementation in the
server can handle security relevant handshake parameters
properly
Purpose Test SSL/TLS server implementation correctness
Type robustness
Table 5.14: SSL/TLS Server Handshake
Attribute Value
ATC ID ATC207
ATCName SSL/TLS Package Boundaries
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Input Packages with message length slightly less, equal and
slightly more than 2 powered 14 bytes (further called in-
valid packages)
Output
Evaluation Criteria Package is not accepted by any party. Connection may be
aborted by receiving party. (both is permitted to pass the
test)
Environmental re-
quirements
Server with SSL support, Client with SSL support
Special Procedural
Requirements
Record transmission
Execution Proce-
dure
Client starts SSL/TLS session. Clients sends invalid
packages to server. Client closes SSL/TLS session.
Cliend starts SSL/TLS session. Server sends invalid
packages to client.
Precondition
Postcondition
Description This test assures that the SSL/TLS implementation oper-
ates correct on its boundaries
Purpose Test SSL/TLS implementation behavior on its boundary
Type boundary
Table 5.15: SSL/TLS Package Boundaries
The atomic test cases are now explained in detail. It has to be mentioned
that the functional testing techniques, as well as known problems and secu-
rity issues from [USE96] and [And01] have influenced the crafting of these
cases. Hence they cover most of the significant spots of the requirements
specification.
SSL/TLS Transfer (table 5.10)
This atomic test case aims on the main task of the requirement, to provide
an encrypted communication over an untrusted network. As SSL/TLS does
provide protection for data confidentiality as well as data integrity during
the transfer over a network, this test covers both areas. Even tough the re-
quirement can be tested in detail, such general tests of the main target of the
requirement are indispensable for testing its correct functionality. As this
case tests for the behavior of the implementation in a typical usage scenario
it an be classified as usage-based.
SSL/TLS Closed Connection Reestablishment (table 5.11)
The reestablishment of old sessions is part of the SSL/TLS specification. This
is especially important for security testing as an implementation failure in
80 5 Derivation of Functional Security Test Cases
this part can lead to serious security problems. Hence this functionality is
covered by a test cases. However, it has to be mentioned that the test case
can only aim on the correct behavior of this feature for some situations. An
attacker with malicious intend could find situations in which the requirement
does not behave as specified. Due to the focus of this test case it can be
classified as usage-based. This is caused due to testing procedure, which is
strongly influenced by the intended usage of a connection reestablishment.
SSL/TLS Approved algorithm (table 5.12)
As above mentioned, the SSL/TLS requirement can achieve different maxi-
mum security levels. This is caused due to specifications given by the SMRT,
which prescribes the kind of used algorithms. Hence the used algorithm de-
termines the exact security level. Due to that a test case is created to check
for the used algorithms and their compliance with the regulations given by
the SMRT. As it can be seen in table 5.12, the configuration file of the im-
plementation is checked for the used algorithms which are further checked
for compliance with the security level specifications. For security Level 2 no
such regulations have to be taken into account, while it is necessary to use
only Crypto Advisor Council (CAC) [Tel], [TC07] approved algorithms to
achieve a Level 3 classification. As this reflects a requirement for the imple-
mentation, the test case can be classified as requirement-based.
SSL/TLS Client Handshake (table 5.13)
When observing the SSL/TLS specification in order to detect security issues,
a critical point is the establishment of new connections. Due to that this test
case aims on security problems, which might occur in this stage. As the
server and the client have slightly different tasks in the establishment pro-
cess, they are addressed by separated test cases. As it can be seen in table
5.13, the criteria for evaluating the success of the test case are quite long
compared to other atomic test cases. This is caused by the level of detail of
this test in order to detect implementation misbehavior. However, it would
be possible to go deeper into the transfered packages and check each single
one for its correctness and potential failures. As the specification describes
every single piece of exchanged information this could be done without any
obstacles. When doing so the above mentioned balance between the neces-
sary effort and the level of detail of a test case has to be kept in mind. Hence
the test case shown in table 5.13 does observe the implementation not on
such a level of detail. According to the aim of the test on the robustness of
the establishment process it can be classified as robustness test.
SSL/TLS Server Handshake (table 5.14)
In comparison to the above described test for the robustness of the connec-
tion establishment from a client point of view, this test has the same focus
in regard to the implementation of the server. Due to that it has slightly
similar content, but targets at a different role within the establishment pro-
5.2 Crafting of Functional Security Test Cases 81
cedure. The main focus of this test lies on the correct use of security relevant
parameters and the handling of faults. Another important point is the accep-
tance of client connections with weak algorithms or old protocol versions.
On the one hand a server should enable connections to a whole range of
different clients, all having diverse SSL/TLS implementations and versions.
On the other hand it should provide that the transfer is protected. Due to
this complementary requirements compromises have to be maid. Instead of
accepting every weak cryptographic algorithm or old and unsafe protocol
version, a minimum level of both are required. This trade-off has to be made
to provide protection on the given security level.
SSL/TLS Package Boundaries (table 5.15)
The last atomic test case aims on the boundaries of the SSL/TLS specifi-
cation. A limit which is set in the standard described in [IET99], is the
length of a message. According to that a classical boundary test focus on
the behavior of the implementation on, and around this boundary. It would
be possible to define more tests which focus on such boundaries, as for ex-
ample most of the exchanged data during the handshake procedure have to
have a fixed size or content. On the other hand this would generate more test
cases, which would mostly not be executed due to limited resources during
the testing process.
Summarized it can be seen that the presented atomic test cases cover some
security relevant spots of the requirement. Although it would be possible to
dive deeper into technical details, the showed level allows a time-efficient
conduction of the tests while still taking important technical issues into ac-
count. In regard to the functional testing techniques from section 3.3, it can
be stated out that every of the techniques, except the Equivalence Partition-
ing is used. The reason for that is the same as described in subsection 5.2.1.
Some of the techniques are even covered by multiple test cases. In compari-
son to the above presented atomic test cases in subection 5.2.1, the recently
described ones have a stronger technical focus and test for specific details of
the implementation. As already mentioned at the beginning of this section,
this is caused by the availability of a strict specification of the implemented
requirement.
5.2.2.3 Composition of Test Case Specifications
As the atomic test cases and the test case specifications are already created, it
is now possible to link them together. As mentioned in the above subsection,
this includes not only a mapping between them, but also the determination of
the security- and regression levels. The linkage between the test case specifi-
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cations from table 5.9 and the recently presented atomic test cases is shown
in table 5.16.
Test Case Specification Atomic Test Case
SSL/TLS without CAC approved algorithm SSL/TLS Transfer (table 5.10)
SSL/TLS without CAC approved algorithm SSL/TLS Closed Connection Reestablishment
(table 5.11)
SSL/TLS without CAC approved algorithm SSL/TLS Client Handshake (table 5.13)
SSL/TLS without CAC approved algorithm SSL/TLS Server Handshake (table 5.14)
SSL/TLS without CAC approved algorithm SSL/TLS Package Boundaries (table 5.15)
SSL/TLS with CAC approved algorithm SSL/TLS Transfer (table 5.10)
SSL/TLS with CAC approved algorithm SSL/TLS Closed Connection Reestablishment
(table 5.11)
SSL/TLS with CAC approved algorithm SSL/TLS SSL/TLS Approved algorithm (table
5.12)
SSL/TLS with CAC approved algorithm SSL/TLS Client Handshake (table 5.13)
SSL/TLS with CAC approved algorithm SSL/TLS Server Handshake (table 5.14)
SSL/TLS with CAC approved algorithm SSL/TLS Package Boundaries (table 5.15)
Table 5.16 Mapping between the test case specifications (table 5.9) and atomic test cases
It can be seen that most of the atomic test cases are used by both test case
specifications. The aim of the first specification is to achieve a security Level
2, both on the confidentiality and the integrity dimension. Due to that high
classification, the requirement is tested properly. The second specification
aims on security Level 3 on the same dimensions. Hence a more secure
implementation is necessary, which implies also more comprehensive tests.
According to the SMRT, the approval of the used cryptographic algorithms is
the core requirement to achieve a Level 3 classification. To meet this require-
ment, the second specification includes an additional test case which aims
on this fact. According to the high security levels of both test case specifica-
tions, their regression level is set to Level 2. This prescribes a conduction of
all test cases in most regression tests.
Subsumed it can be seen that there exists a difference when creating test
case specifications and atomic test cases for generic requirements, as demon-
strated in subsection 5.2.1, or for accurate specified ones as it has been
demonstrated in this subsection. Both types of requirements have different
aims which leads further to different test cases. Hence this need for a differ-
ent outcome must be kept in mind when conducting the process for creating
content.
Chapter 6
Validation of the Functional Security Testing
Approach
When observing the functional security testing approach from chapter 4
and the generated test cases from chapter 5, a need for measuring both
arises. To measure the quantitative aspect, which refers to the completeness
of coverage of requirements by their test cases, a method which includes the
functional security testing techniques can be used. The qualitative aspect can
be measured according to the criteria, which were described in chapter 1.
There it is stated that the developed approach should fulfill some parts of the
Common Criteria [ISO07] as shown in figure 1.1. In addition to this deep
and specific evaluation, other relevant security standard from chapter 2 are
used for creating a more holistic validating of the qualitative aspects of the
approach. The practical usage of the approach is another criteria, which is of
special importance for TeliaSonera. Due to all of these measures not only
the functional security testing approach itself, but also the developed content
and its practical usage is validated.
This chapter starts with a validation of the approach against the men-
tioned parts of the common criteria and other important security standards
from chapter 2. Subsequently an approach for measuring the coverage of re-
quirements by test cases is presented. The last validation part gives insight
in the use of the approach in a real project. Hence all these parts represent
a comprehensive validation of the approach against its requirements, which
were described in chapter 1.
6.1 Validation against the Common Criteria
In order to validate the developed approach against the families and classes
of the Common Criteria (CC), which are relevant in this case (figure 1.1),
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these parts have to be observed in more detail. In the tests class (Class ATE:
Tests) of the CC it is stated out that:
Testing provides assurance that the TSF [TOE Security Function] behaves as described
(in the functional specification, TOE [Target of Evaluation] design, and implementation
representation). [...] The emphasis in this class is on confirmation that the TSF operates
according to its design descriptions. This class does not address penetration testing [...]
[ISO07]
Hence it can be said that this class and its included families are relevant for
assessing the functional security testing approach. The different families are:
• ATE COV: Coverage
• ATE DPT: Depth
• ATE FUN: Functional tests
• ATE IND: Independent testing
Further it is described in the CC that these families can be separated accord-
ing to the persons or roles that are aimed on. The first three families (Cover-
age, Depth, Functional tests) target on the developer and are named Devel-
oper testing. The remaining family (Independent testing) aims on the eval-
uator and is called Evaluator testing. TeliaSonera has a developers point of
view, which the functional security testing approach should support. Hence
only the developer testing families are taken into account. Subsequently we
discuss these families and the validation of the approach according to them.
It has to be mentioned that the validation is concerned about the ability of the
approach to provide support for systems to achieve an EAL2 classification.
Hence the validation aims on the application of the approach for functional
security testing, not on the components of the approach itself.
6.1.1 ATE COV: Coverage
In the CC this family is described as concerning about the fulfillment of a
systems specification. It is stated that:
This family establishes that the TSF has been testes against its functional specification. [...]
[ISO07]
As shown in figure 1.1 the level to achieve for the approach is Level 1.
The requirements for this level are that some of the TOE Security Function
Interfaces (TSFI) have been tested. Regarding the developed approach, this
criteria can be seen as fulfilled, as the approach aims on the functional testing
of security requirements according to their specifications. Even though the
fundamental aim of this family is fulfilled, it can be observed in more detail.
6.1 Validation against the Common Criteria 85
In the CC it is further described that the following actions and artifacts must
be performed and created [ISO07]:
Developer action elements The developer shall provide evidence of the
test coverage.
Content and presentation elements The evidence of the test coverage shall
show the correspondence between the tests in the test documentation and
the TSFIs in the functional specification.
Evaluator action elements The evaluator shall confirm that the information
provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
The Developer action elements requirements are fulfilled as the coverage of
the test cases is assessed in the Analyze activity of the approach’s process
(section 4.2). Further the coverage of the included security requirements
by its test cases is validated in section 6.3. The Content and presentation
elements refer to the mapping of requirements to its functional test cases.
This represents a test for their specifications fulfillment. As stated out in
chapter 4, this mapping is one of the core components of the approach and
directly influences the Design test plan activity.
The Evaluator action elements refer to the kind of provided information
for the evaluator and are in this case of no further concern, as TeliaSonera is
the developer and not the evaluator. Summarized it can be said that the func-
tional security testing approach meets every requirement to support systems
to be classified as Level 1 compliant to this family.
6.1.2 ATE DPT: Depth
As shown in figure 1.1 it is not necessary to fulfill any component of this
family to have an EAL2 compliant system. However, the developed ap-
proach provides the fulfillment of requirements of this family. Hence this
part is examined now in more detail. This family aims on the level of detail
the TSF is tested by the developer [ISO07]. In the CC it is described what
has to be done to achieve a Level 3 classification in this family:
The subsystem and module descriptions of the TSF provide a high-level description of the
internal workings, and a description of the interfaces of the modules, of the TSF. [ISO07]
The high-level description of the internal workings, as well as the description
of the interfaces are given through the requirements and test cases in the
approach. Hence this aim can be stated out as fulfilled. When drilling deeper
into this family, the following sub-requirements are described [ISO07]:
Developer action elements The developer shall provide the analysis of the
depth of testing.
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Content and presentation elements The analysis of the depth of testing
shall demonstrate the correspondence between the tests in the test doc-
umentation and the TSF subsystems and modules in the TOE design. The
analysis of the depth of testing shall demonstrate that all TSF subsystems
in the TOE design have been tested. The analysis of the depth of test-
ing shall demonstrate that all TSF modules in the TOE design have been
tested.
Evaluator action elements The evaluator shall confirm that the information
provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
The Developer action elements part refers to an analyzation of the tests ac-
cording to their depth. This can be achieved by an analysis of the test cases
by the developer and the Analyze activity from section 4.2. The content and
presentation elements require to take aspects outside the approach into ac-
count. This depends on the system picture. Assumptions have to be made
about the specification and the complete codification of the system by its
requirements. Each codified security requirement can be tested by the ap-
proach. This can be said as the extendibility of the approach provides that
missing test data for a requirement can be added. Another aspect is the pro-
tection level a requirement is tested on. As this level further defines the rigor
a requirement is testes with, it also affects the depth of the tests which is de-
termined by the business need as shown in section 4.1. Hence it is possible
that requirements are completely tested for each system components they
apply. The Analyze activity can further show the depth of the tests and can
be used to assess the depth of testing against the specification. The Evaluator
action elements are the same as in the previous family ATE COV: Coverage,
where they are already described.
Summarized it has been shown in this part, that all requirements to pro-
vide a Level 3 classification for systems are met.
6.1.3 ATE FUN: Functional tests
This family is about the correct documentation and conduction of tests. The
level to achieve is according to figure 1.1 Level 1. When regarding the top
level aim of this level it is written in the CC that:
The objective is for the developer to demonstrate that the tests in the test documentation are
performed and documented correctly. [ISO07]
As the documentation and conduction of tests is supported by the functional
security testing approach, it can be said that the main target of this family is
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already met. Subsequently a more detailed description of the requirements
for this level is given [ISO07]:
Developer action elements The developer shall test the TSF and document
the results. The developer shall provide test documentation.
Content and presentation elements The test documentation shall consist of
test plans, expected test results and actual test results. The test plans shall
identify the tests to be performed and describe the scenarios for perform-
ing each test. These scenarios shall include any ordering dependencies
on the results of other tests. The expected test results shall show the an-
ticipated outputs from a successful execution of the tests. The actual test
results shall be consistent with the expected test results.
Evaluator action elements The evaluator shall confirm that the information
provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
The Developer action elements, as well as the Content and presentation ele-
ments are both supported by the developed approach. Documentation about
the executed tests is provided by the Test result artifact from section 4.2 and
further the statistical information table of the approach. The included test
cases contain not only information about the expected test results and out-
puts. They also provide a mapping between requirements and test cases in
regard to dependencies between them. Hence the pre-codified nature of the
security requirements and their related test cases allows a simpler and more
comprehensive documentation. The Compare results to test cases activity
(section 4.2) provides fulfillment of the requirement for assuring the con-
sistency of test results. The last point, Evaluator action elements, is equal to
the other families.
Summarized it can be said that the developed functional security testing ap-
proach does not only achieve the required sophistication level, which we
described in chapter 1. It also provides the fulfillment of the ATE DPT fam-
ily on Level 3, as shown in figure 6.1. Due to the above discussed evaluation
of the approach and its support for the functional security testing of systems
it can be said that the validation against the mentioned parts of the CC has
been successful and the structure of the approach fulfills the given require-
ments. Further not only the requirements for the testing part of an EAL2
classification are fulfilled by applying the approach, as it also includes the
additional ATE DPT family. Hence it can be declared as EAL2+ compliant.
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ATE_FUN: Functional tests
ATE_IND: Independent testing
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Fig. 6.1 Common Criteria, Class ATE: Tests, adapted from [ISO07]
6.2 Validation against other relevant parts of standards
As already mentioned in chapter 2, not only the CC has influenced the func-
tional security testing approach, but other standards contributed as well. In
this section we discuss the influence of these standards on the functional se-
curity testing approach and compare the compliance goals from chapter 2
with the actual approach.
ISO/IEC 27002 [ISO05c] and its Asset classification and control security
control is addressed by the functional security testing approach due to the
use of information classification and further the SMRT (see section 4.1).
This further influences the Test Plan artifact of the approach. In section 2.1
we identified another relevant part for this work. Systems development and
maintenance is concerned about mostly technical security topics which play
an important role for the development and maintenance of systems. Hence
this part has its major impact on the approach’s content, the test cases, not
on the design of the approach itself. Still, some parts of this security control
have been used for the approach itself. Security requirements of systems and
Security requirements analysis and specification are both concerned about
assuring that the appropriate level of security from a business perspective is
met. This objective is targeted by the functional security testing approach
due to the use of TeliaSonera’s information classification and its impact on
the Test Plan artifact for specified requirements.
IEEE Std 829 [ISO98] has been used as a base for structuring and orga-
nizing test cases in the database of the functional security testing approach.
The recommendations and guidelines provided by this standard are there-
fore integrated into a core part of the approach, which we further discussed
in section 4.3.
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ISO/IEC 21827 [Pro02] includes the Process Area (PA) 11 - Verify and
Validate Security. As we already described in chapter 2, it targets on two
main goals [Pro02]:
• Solutions meet security requirements
• Solutions meet the customers operational security needs
The first goal is addressed by the approach’s capability of defining a linkage
between security requirements and test cases to test for the correct function-
ality of the specified requirements. Further the Test Plan artifact captures the
security requirements of a system and the Analyze activity of the approach’s
process aims on evaluating if the security requirements are actually met. The
second issue of the mentioned process area is taken care of by the informa-
tion classification and the SMRT. The information classification derives the
technical protection needs due to the business needs and further determines
the strength and kind of mechanism from the SMRT. This assures that the
specified security needs of a system are aligned with the operational security
needs of an organizations business.
6.2.1 Validation against ITIL
As we discussed in section 2.1, some parts of the ITIL standard [ITI08] are
important for this thesis and have influenced the development of the func-
tional security testing approach. Subsequently, we show how the developed
approach fulfills the set compliance goals from section 2.1.
Service Warranty [CHR+07] is a concept from the strategic part of ITIL
and is fulfilled by the approach due to the use of information classification
and the SMRT which further influences the Test Plan artifact (see section
4.2. This assures the technical fitness of a system for its later usage from a
business perspective.
In the design stage of the ITIL life-cycle we identified the proactive ac-
tivities of Availability Management as compliance goals for this work. This
issue is addressed by the proactive nature of the approach which provides
to improve the overall quality of systems it is applied to before they are put
into operation. This quality improvement is achieved due to the Test Plan
artifact for proactive planning and design and the Analyze activity for rec-
ommendations concerning the security (including availability) of systems
from a business perspective given due to the information classification and
the Test Plan. Another part in this ITIL life-cycle stage is Information Se-
curity Management (ISM). ISM aims on confidentiality, integrity and avail-
ability (C,I,A) issues. It requires the proper management of these aspects
90 6 Validation of the Functional Security Testing Approach
to achieve an adequate level of C,I and A according to the organization’s
business needs. This is addressed by the functional security testing approach
from the very beginning due to the use of TeliaSonera’s information classi-
fication, which captures the business needs for protecting its systems.
The remaining relevant ITIL part for this work is situated in the service
transition stage. The Service Validation and Testing process is concerned
about appropriate testing and validation of IT solutions according to an or-
ganization’s business risks [CHR+07]. Thereby the critical issue is to define
the appropriate level of testing and validation. To solve this issue the func-
tional security testing approach relies on the given information classification
which captures business risks and transforms them into protection needs.
These protection needs are further used by the approach’s Design test plan
activity and Test Plan artifact to determine the appropriate level of testing.
In this section we discussed the influence of some security standards on
the development of the functional security testing approach. Further we val-
idated the relevant parts, which we already described in chapter 2, against
these standards and best practices. Summarized we showed that the func-
tional security testing approach fulfills the compliance goals from section
2.1.
6.3 Validation of requirements coverage
To assess the coverage of requirements by its test cases, different approaches
can be used. The opportunities reach from a simple counting system till ex-
pert based observations. As the counting of test cases has no meaning to
assess the coverage and the expert based observation can be declared as too
cost and time intensive, a meaningful but also cost oriented way of assess-
ing must be found. As already stated in chapter 5, the functional testing
techniques (section 3.3) can be taken into account to create evaluation cri-
teria. Hence these techniques are used for this assessment as well. When
observing security requirements and their correlating test cases, the kind of
used testing techniques by the test cases must be kept in mind. This can be
seen as an indication of the completeness of coverage of a requirement by
its test cases. If a requirement does not use a certain functional security test-
ing technique for its test cases, there must be a reason why this technique is
not suitable for this requirement. Otherwise some test cases may be missing.
Due to that the completeness of coverage of a requirement by its linked test
cases can be evaluated.
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It has to be mentioned that this approach to assess the completeness is
heuristic. It can only give a hunch of the grade of coverage and should not
be seen as assurance that the test cases check for the entire functionality of
a requirement. A list of requirements and their use of functional test tech-
niques by their atomic test cases is shown in table 6.1. This table gives an
overview of some requirements. As the functional security testing approach
is designed to be continuously extended, it should either be seen as a basis
to build-up than a complete listing. An important point to mention is that
Equivalence-partitioning is the only technique which can not be assessed
directly due to observing the atomic test cases. As already mentioned in sec-
tion 5.2, this technique cannot be used on the atomic test case level. Hence
the usage of this technique is assessed manually in table 6.1, while all other
techniques are directly extracted from the database.
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RQ0:Standard one factor authentication X X X X X
RQ1:Strong one factor authentication X X X X X
RQ100:Basic discretionary Access Control X X
RQ1000:Basic Public-Private-Key based Key
management
X X
RQ1001:Basic Shared Private Key based Key
management
X X
RQ1002:Advanced Public-Private-Key based
Key management
X X
RQ1003:Advanced Shared Private Key based
Key management
X X
RQ1004:Extensive Public-Private-Key based
Key management
X X
RQ1005:Extensive Shared Private Key based
Key management
X X
RQ101:Advanced discretionary Access Con-
trol
X X
RQ102:Basic Role-based Access Control X X X
RQ103:Advanced Role-based Access Control X X X X
RQ104:Mandatory Access Control X X X
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RQ2:Two factor authentication X X X X X
RQ200:Non-cryptopgraphic based Checksum X
RQ201:MultiProtocol Label Switching X X
RQ202:SSL/TLS X X X X
RQ203:IPsec X X X
RQ3:Physical two factor authentication X X X X X
RQ400:Weak cryptographic integrity protec-
tion
X
RQ401:Write once read many memory X X
RQ402:Smartcard X
RQ403:Strong cryptographic integrity protec-
tion
X X
RQ500:Basic stored file encyrption X X X
RQ501:Strong encryption of selected areas or
files
X X X
RQ502:Strong encryption of entire disk X X X
RQ503:Smartcards as storage device X X X
RQ600:Slow Incident Detection X X X
RQ601:Continous Incident Detection X X X
RQ602:Real-time Incident Detection X X X
RQ603:Active response Intrusion Detection
System with host generated data
X X X
RQ604:Active response Intrusion Detection
System with host and network generated data
X X X
RQ605:Constantly human supervised Intru-
sion Detection system
X X X
RQ700:ISO-9000 X
RQ701:ISO/IEC 1799/2005 X
RQ702:IRT-planning X
RQ703:CERT-planning X
RQ800:Basic traceability X
RQ801:Advanced traceability X
RQ802:Extensive tracability X
RQ803:Legal complying tracability X
RQ900:Local Backups X X
RQ901:Cold standby systems X X X
RQ902:Physically seperated Backups X X
RQ903:Warm standby systems X X X
RQ904:Location seperated Backups X X
6.3 Validation of requirements coverage 93
RQ905:Hot standby systems X X X
Table 6.1: Requirement coverage by functional test techniques
It can be seen in table 6.1 that not all requirements are fully covered by
every test technique. This can be caused due to the following reasons.
Inapplicability of the testing technique In some cases a testing technique
can be useless or inapplicable for a certain requirement. Such a relation
is mostly caused due to the nature of the requirement or the testing tech-
nique. For example it is not possibly to apply a boundary or robustness
test to the requirement for ISO-9000 compliance. These test techniques
are simply inadequate and thus inapplicable for this kind of requirement.
There is no reasonable case in which such a technique can be used to test
this requirement. As shown in table 6.1, such a situation is given quite
often especially when it comes down to generic requirements as described
in section 5.2.
Ambiguity of test case classification As defined by the database schema
described in chapter 4, an atomic test case can be classified according to
the functional testing techniques from section 3.3. Thereby the test case
must be classified by a best-fit matching as one of the given techniques.
In some cases this can lead to ambiguity as an atomic test case probably
uses more than one technique, and just one of them can be picked as clas-
sification for the whole test case in regard to the best-fit matching. While
this could be avoided by a split of the test cases, this may not be done due
to feasibility reasons. For example it can be practicable to include some
usage aspects in a requirements test, as they sometimes can aim on sim-
ilar behavior. Even tough a solution for this problem would be to allow
an atomic test case to be classified as using multiple testing techniques,
this is not supported by the approach. This design decision is caused by
the fundamental assumption that an atomic test case should be atomic.
Hence it should just aim on testing a certain small part of a requirement.
Due to that one testing technique should be enough to classify an atomic
test case. Another advantage of this restriction is that the developer of
new content is forced to keep the atomic test cases focused and reusable.
This reusability further leads to a higher benefit from the approach in the
long-run. However, this ambiguity is prevented in the currently included
atomic test cases and was just mentioned as additional explanation in case
of a further content extension and re-evaluation of the quantitative aspect
of the approach.
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Summarized it can be said that there exist some reasons why a require-
ment is not covered by all testing techniques. However, the aim of the de-
veloped test cases is to create a holistic but superficial coverage of the given
requirements. As it can be seen in table 6.1, such a coverage is given for the
included requirements. Hence it can be stated out that the developed content
base provides satisfactory coverage for the given requirements.
6.4 Validation in a real-life project
To test the practical applicability of the functional security testing approach,
a project has been chosen. As the aim of this validation is to get first feed-
back, an Uppdrag (engl.: Assignment) is considered as the most convenient
way for performing an initial reality check. This term describes a small
project in TeliaSonera. Min Familj (engl.: My family) is such an Uppdrag,
which takes place during the creation of this thesis and hence has been cho-
sen for applying the functional security testing approach. Subsequently some
facts and figures about the project are presented:
• Mobile telecommunication package for families
• Includes a shared calendar which can be used by all family members over
the internet and mobile devices
• Maximal budget of 2000.000 SEK (Swedish Crowns)
• Mobility project
• Conducted in the organizational line
The critical part in this project is the calendar application. Hence the func-
tional security testing approach is used for it. An information classification,
which was followed by a gap analysis (see section 4.1), performed by an in-
ternal security expert showed a need for protecting the personal data entered
in the calendar at level 2-2-3 (C,I,A). The data entered into this system can
be seen as important from a privacy perspective. The protection of them is
critical to avoid bad reputation for TeliaSonera and provide customer satis-
faction. Hence such a high classification can be justified. Subsequently the
steps of the testing process from chapter 4 are described. Thereby the focus
is not on the process itself, as this was already described in the mentioned
chapter. In order to create a validation of the approach we discuss the con-
duction of the process steps in the Min Familj project.
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6.4.1 Design test plan
During the creation of the test plan, not only the functional security testing
approach has been considered. In addition also security checklists (see sec-
tion 4.2) have been included in the test plan. The use of the approach for
identifying test cases according to given requirements and security levels
turned out to be complicated in the beginning. A critical issue, which was
mentioned by the creator of the test plan, was the missing graphical inter-
face. Due to that it was necessary to perform SQL statements to extract the
needed data from the approach. A less skilled tester would probably not have
been able to do this task properly. As this critical issue was considered by
me and my superviser Albin Zuccato in advance, such a graphical interface
is currently under development and already reached a maturity stage which
solves the mentioned problem.
When the tester extracted the relevant data from the database he identified
a number of 8 TestCaseSpecifications in total for the given requirements. 6
of these specifications matched to the given requirements without any objec-
tions. The remaining 2 were valuable as well, but had some shortcomings,
as some aspects of the requirements were not considered in detail. However,
due to the use of the test case specifications the tester mentioned the positive
effect of discovering missing or ambiguous parts in the system’s specifica-
tion. According to [Boe81] this reduces the need for change in later stages of
the project. Thus costs can be lowered and the time for conducting projects
can be reduced.
Due to the missing graphical support, 3 hours have been spent by the
tester for understanding the approach and executing necessary SQL requests.
For a first draft of the test plan 2 hours were needed. Finally the tester fin-
ished the document after 1 hour of verification in the end. According to the
experience of the tester, it takes an average of 6 to 8 hours to create a proper
test plan.
The 3 hours in the beginning can be considered as start activity, which
is obsolete when using the graphical user interface in the future. Hence the
average time for the test plan creation can be halved from more than 6 to 3
hours by using the functional security testing approach. This is a significant
improvement for TeliaSonera.
6.4.2 Run program with test data
As the project included only requirements which were already in the content
base of the approach, there was no need for designing new test cases. Hence
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the activities Design test cases and Prepare test data had no importance in
this case. This possibility to skip the activities is described in section 4.2.
The execution of the atomic test cases was done without any major prob-
lems. An issue which was mentioned by the executing tester was the level of
the atomic test cases. It was proposed that it would be beneficial to make the
atomic test cases shorter and hence ”more atomic”. This would increase the
possibilities for reusing them and reassemble more detailed test case specifi-
cations. This issue was already considered earlier during the creation of the
approach. As a design decision which was mainly driven by constraints due
to limited resources, the level of the atomic test cases is not as granular, as
it could be. However, this is part of the further development of the approach
for TeliaSonera.
6.4.3 Compare results to test cases
As the test cases include a description of the expected results, this task was
conducted without any problems. A field of difficulty for generic require-
ments could be the interpretation of the criteria for the evaluation of the
tests, but in this case the tester did not mention it as a problem. Hence the
comparison of the results was an easy task in this case which did not put too
much demands on the tester’s capabilities.
6.4.4 Analysis
The analysis of the results lacked of graphical support. In this project this
was not brought up by the tester as a problem, which is mainly caused due
to the small number of test cases and therefore few test results to analyze.
Still, for a later usage in larger projects this is likely to be a critical issue.
Hence the interface has to be extended to sufficiently support also this last
activity.
Summarized it can be said that the use of the approach did not only facilitate
the whole testing process for the tester, but also improved the quality level of
the specification while lowering the costs and the time of execution. Hence
the functional security testing approach fulfills its task to improve TeliaSon-
era’s testing process. Therefore the validation in a real project can be stated
as successful.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
The aim of this work was to show that it is possible to create a correlation
between functional security tests and given security requirements, which en-
ables a direct mapping of test cases to their underlying requirements. In
course of this thesis we discussed how an approach can be designed to solve
this problem. Thereby the aim was not only on developing such an approach
in general, but integrating it into the given structures of TeliaSonera. Due to
that not only the research question was answered, also the benefit from us-
ing the developed artifacts could be significantly increased. The developed
approach helps TeliaSonera to gain assurance about the fulfillment of their
security requirements in a more cost-efficient and effective way as done be-
fore.
In a company of the size of TeliaSonera, constantly a large number of
products and systems are in development. Due to that it is impossible for
the security experts of the company to individually support each project
with security expertise. Hence the approach is designed to encapsulate secu-
rity knowledge, which makes functional security testing suitable to be con-
ducted by non-security experts. This leads to another cost and time advan-
tage for TeliaSonera, as the spare and expensive security experts can focus
their knowledge in the approach and hence spread it throughout the whole
organization with reduced effort.
Although the fundamentals and core of this thesis are academic, its out-
come has also practical value. The developed approach did not only undergo
theoretical validations. Its was further used and validated in a real-world
project. Hence it was possible to evaluate if the theoretical assumptions sus-
tain the transfer to operational reality. As shown in this thesis the approach
fulfills the demands put on it and its usage leads to the above mentioned
benefits as well in reality.
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7.1 Contributions of this work
The aim of this thesis is to show that it is possible to create a mapping be-
tween requirements and test cases. Even though this has been the main tar-
get during the working process, it is not the only contribution. During the
process of creating this work some additional findings have been made. It
can be said that those are all focused on the security testing topic, but they
are still situated in different areas. These areas reach from theoretical ones,
like the Definition of Functional Security Testing, to practical ones like the
Atomic Test Cases. Some of them were developed due to the necessity to
have a foundation for the functional security testing approach, while oth-
ers are a simple outcome of the development of the approach itself. Hence
the presented contributions are settled along the whole creation process of
this work, which is shown in figure 1.2. Due to the diverse areas the con-
tributions are situated in, they are of different importance for TeliaSonera
and the scientific community. While the theoretical findings are likely to be
of higher value for scientific research, the more practical oriented ones are
considered more valuable for TeliaSonera. However, this work includes both
types and hence provides useful information for its whole target audience.
Subsequently the contributions of this work are described.
Definition of Functional Security Testing In chapter 3 an overview of dif-
ferent security testing approaches is given. As the focus of this work is
on functional security testing this chapter especially targetes on that. Due
to the missing definition of functional security testing, one is presented in
section 3.3.
Automatizing parts of the testing process The developed functional secu-
rity testing approach from chapter 4 includes not only static aspects like
the database schema, but also aims on supporting the dynamic testing
process as described in section 4.2. This idea of how to support and au-
tomatize the process is another contribution of this work.
Atomic Test Cases The quantitative part of this thesis is mainly repre-
sented by the developed content for the functional security testing ap-
proach, especially by the atomic test cases. The atomic test cases are the
accomplishable tests which aim to test a certain area of one or more re-
quirements. The developed tests have a superficial but holistic coverage of
the included requirements and can be seen as contribution of this thesis.
Link between Requirements and Test Cases The main aim of this thesis is
to show that it is possible to create a correlation between functional secu-
rity tests and given security requirements, which enables a direct mapping
of test cases to their underlying requirements. The creation of this linkage
is a contribution of this work. The link between the business domain and
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the needed protection mechanism for security is mentioned in section 4.1
and given by the SMRT. This thesis shows how to create the link between
the requirements and their test cases in order to provide proper functional
security tests for them.
7.2 Outlook and further research
The current development stage of the presented functional security testing
approach allows a use as repository for functional test cases. It can further
be used to support a testing process through automation. Additional to the
current functionality some ideas of how to extend the approach in future
came up. Extension should in this case be seen as extension of the qualita-
tive component of the approach itself, rather than the development of more
test cases for the current structures. These further research ideas are subse-
quently described.
7.2.1 Attack Patterns
Attack Patterns, as described in [MIT08a], show a schema of how to orga-
nize common attacks to reduce the complexity of execution due to standard-
ization. These attacks do not reach a sophistication level as a penetration
test does. In comparison to functional tests, which do not include tests with
malicious intend, they have a stronger attackers point of view.
Figure 7.1 shows this relation. As it can be seen, the attack patterns
lie in the fuzzy area between the functional- and penetration tests. This is
caused due to the fact that a strong delineation between these areas can not
be drawn as the intermediate parts include various elements of both testing
techniques. However, projects like [MIT08a] provide a standardized struc-
ture for attack patterns. Hence it should be possible to integrate them into the
functional security testing approach what would lead to an extension which
can cover most testing needs of TeliaSonera. As already mentioned in sec-
tion 4.2, systems sometimes need to be tested more comprehensive than
it could be achieved by functional tests alone. Due to that an extension of
the approach with this kind of simple and canned penetration attacks would
provide higher benefit for TeliaSonera.
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Fig. 7.1 The relation between functional- , attack pattern based- and penetration testing, adapted
from [TT07]
7.2.2 Software Weakness Collection
The Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) [MIT08b] provides a collec-
tion of known software weaknesses. It was already mentioned in section 4.4
as idea for extending the top level schema. Another project which has the
same aim as the CWE can be found in [OWA08]. An integrated link to a
known weakness would allow various new opportunities to assess and con-
trol the completeness of a requirements coverage by its test cases. Such a
validation can take the coverage of a requirement according to known weak-
nesses into account. Due to that a coverage of them by the contained test
cases in the database would be possible. Hence it can be said that the further
integration of the CWE or another collection of software weaknesses would
provide completely new possibilities to validate the quantitative quality of
the testing approach. This leads to a higher benefit for TeliaSonera. Hence it
should be considered for further research and development in this area.
7.2.3 More Automatization
The described process in section 4.2 shows how a standard testing process,
as mentioned in section 2.5, can be supported by the functional security
testing approach. This support is mostly given due to automatization of ac-
7.2 Outlook and further research 101
tivities and the providence of artifacts. The opportunity to execute the testing
process faster and more cost efficient is the core value for TeliaSonera. Due
to that it should be considered as further research area. To achieve a higher
grade of automatization different ideas came up during the creation of this
work. A standardized derivation from an identified protection need to a re-
quirement would provide a higher automatization in the first steps of the
process, thus enabling a direct mapping from a protection need over a re-
quirement till the tests which have to be conducted. In the later activities the
execution of tests is one of the major time consuming activities. To achieve
a higher level of automatization in this activity a methodology for creating
machine understandable and executable test cases should be introduced. As
TeliaSonera deals mostly with heterogeneous systems and hence diverse re-
quirements, such an automation can in all likelihood not be accomplished for
all test cases. However, specific requirements which are based on strict tech-
nical specifications can be tested by such automated tests as already partially
done within TeliaSonera [Tel07a] or demonstrated in [AS08].
Summarized it can be said that a higher grade of automation can be di-
rectly transformed into value created due to cost- and time reductions.
7.2.4 Compliance to standards
As already mentioned in chapter 2, some security standards are used for the
functional security testing approach. The approach enables a shift of Telia-
Sonera’s product life cycle towards better compliance to [ISO05c], [Pro02],
[ITI08] and [ISO07]. As already some aspects of these standards are in-
cluded into TeliaSonera’s practices and the developed approach aims on a
sound integration into the structures of TeliaSonera, some parts of the stan-
dards have indirectly influenced its development (e.g. section 4.1). Still, this
level of compliance could be improved in a future enhancement of the func-
tional security testing approach. Hence we see the further advancement of
the approach for improving its compliance to the mentioned standards as an
important point.
As overall conclusion of this thesis it can be said that an approach for func-
tional security testing has been developed to improve the testing- and there-
fore the whole product life cycle of TeliaSonera. Thereby it is important to
mention that this is not only a theoretical construct as it has been validated
in practice with the outcome that it works and directly creates value for the
company.
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Appendix A
Functional Security Testing Approach Database
Schema
Listing A.1 MySQL Database Schema
1 DROP DATABASE ‘ SecTes tCases ‘ ;
2 CREATE DATABASE ‘ SecTes tCases ‘ ;
3 −− −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− SCHEMA
4 USE ‘ SecTes tCases ‘ ;
5 CREATE TABLE S e c u r i t y L e v e l (
6 SecLeve l ID VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) PRIMARY KEY,
7 SecLeve l INTEGER NOT NULL,
8 SecLevelName VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) NOT NULL,
9 SecLeve lDesc r TEXT,
10 SecLevelType ENUM( ”C” , ” I ” , ”A” ) NOT NULL
11 )ENGINE=INNODB;
12
13 CREATE TABLE R e g r e s s i o n L e v e l (
14 RegLevel ID VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) PRIMARY KEY,
15 RegLevel INTEGER NOT NULL,
16 RegLevelName VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) NOT NULL,
17 RegLeve lDescr TEXT
18 )ENGINE=INNODB;
19
20 CREATE TABLE Mechanism (
21 Mech ID VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) PRIMARY KEY,
22 MechName VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) NOT NULL,
23 MechDescr TEXT
24 )ENGINE=INNODB;
25
26 CREATE TABLE C a t e g o r y (
27 Cat ID VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) PRIMARY KEY,
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28 CatName VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) NOT NULL,
29 Ca tDesc r TEXT
30 )ENGINE=INNODB;
31
32 CREATE TABLE Requ i remen t (
33 Req ID VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) PRIMARY KEY,
34 ReqName VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) NOT NULL,
35 ReqDescr TEXT
36 )ENGINE=INNODB;
37
38 CREATE TABLE T e s t C a s e S p e c i f i c a t i o n (
39 TCS ID VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) PRIMARY KEY,
40 TCSName VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) NOT NULL,
41 TCSDescr TEXT,
42 P r e c o n d i t i o n TEXT,
43 P o s t c o n d i t i o n TEXT
44 )ENGINE=INNODB;
45
46 CREATE TABLE TCSDependency (
47 TCS ID VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) NOT NULL,
48 TCSAnt ID VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) NOT NULL,
49 PRIMARY KEY( TCS ID , TCSAnt ID ) ,
50 CONSTRAINT TCSDep TCS dependency FOREIGN KEY ( TCS ID )
51 REFERENCES T e s t C a s e S p e c i f i c a t i o n ( TCS ID )
52 ON UPDATE CASCADE
53 ON DELETE CASCADE,
54 CONSTRAINT TCSDep TCS dependency2 FOREIGN KEY ( TCSAnt ID )
55 REFERENCES T e s t C a s e S p e c i f i c a t i o n ( TCS ID )
56 ON UPDATE CASCADE
57 ON DELETE CASCADE
58 )ENGINE=INNODB;
59
60 CREATE TABLE AtomicTes tCase (
61 ATC ID VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) PRIMARY KEY,
62 ATCName VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) NOT NULL,
63 Input TEXT,
64 Output TEXT,
65 E v a l C r i t e r i a TEXT NOT NULL,
66 Envi ronment TEXT,
67 SpecProcReq TEXT,
68 ExecProcedu re TEXT NOT NULL,
69 P r e c o n d i t i o n TEXT,
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70 P o s t c o n d i t i o n TEXT,
71 Descr TEXT NOT NULL,
72 Purpose TEXT NOT NULL,
73 ATCType ENUM( ” boundary ” , ” r e q u i r e m e n t ” ,
74 ” r o b u s t n e s s ” , ” usage−based ” , ” e q u i v a l e n c e ” ) NOT NULL
75 )ENGINE=INNODB;
76
77 CREATE TABLE ATCDependency (
78 ATC ID VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) NOT NULL,
79 ATCAnt ID VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) NOT NULL,
80 PRIMARY KEY( ATC ID , ATCAnt ID ) ,
81 CONSTRAINT ATCDep ATC dependency FOREIGN KEY ( ATC ID )
82 REFERENCES AtomicTes tCase ( ATC ID )
83 ON UPDATE CASCADE
84 ON DELETE CASCADE,
85 CONSTRAINT ATCDep ATC dependency2 FOREIGN KEY ( ATCAnt ID )
86 REFERENCES AtomicTes tCase ( ATC ID )
87 ON UPDATE CASCADE
88 ON DELETE CASCADE
89 )ENGINE=INNODB;
90
91 CREATE TABLE Cat2Mech (
92 Cat ID VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) NOT NULL,
93 Mech ID VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) NOT NULL,
94 PRIMARY KEY ( Cat ID , Mech ID ) ,
95 CONSTRAINT Cat2Mech Cat dependency FOREIGN KEY ( Ca t ID )
96 REFERENCES C a t e g o r y ( Cat ID )
97 ON UPDATE CASCADE
98 ON DELETE CASCADE,
99 CONSTRAINT Cat2Mech Mech dependency FOREIGN KEY ( Mech ID )
100 REFERENCES Mechanism ( Mech ID )
101 ON UPDATE CASCADE
102 ON DELETE CASCADE
103 )ENGINE=INNODB;
104
105 CREATE TABLE Mech2Req (
106 Mech ID VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) NOT NULL,
107 Req ID VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) NOT NULL,
108 PRIMARY KEY ( Mech ID , Req ID ) ,
109 CONSTRAINT Mech2Req Cat dependency FOREIGN KEY ( Mech ID )
110 REFERENCES Mechanism ( Mech ID )
111 ON UPDATE CASCADE
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112 ON DELETE CASCADE,
113 CONSTRAINT Mech2Req Req dependency FOREIGN KEY ( Req ID )
114 REFERENCES Requ i remen t ( Req ID )
115 ON UPDATE CASCADE
116 ON DELETE CASCADE
117 )ENGINE=INNODB;
118
119 CREATE TABLE Req2TCS (
120 Req ID VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) NOT NULL,
121 TCS ID VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) NOT NULL,
122 C VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) NOT NULL,
123 I VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) NOT NULL,
124 A VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) NOT NULL,
125 RegLevel ID VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) NOT NULL,
126 PRIMARY KEY( Req ID , TCS ID , C , I , A, RegLevel ID ) ,
127 CONSTRAINT Req2TCS Req dependency FOREIGN KEY ( Req ID )
128 REFERENCES Requ i remen t ( Req ID )
129 ON UPDATE CASCADE
130 ON DELETE CASCADE,
131 CONSTRAINT Req2TCS TCS dependency FOREIGN KEY ( TCS ID )
132 REFERENCES T e s t C a s e S p e c i f i c a t i o n ( TCS ID )
133 ON UPDATE CASCADE
134 ON DELETE CASCADE,
135 CONSTRAINT Req2TCS Reg dependency FOREIGN KEY ( RegLevel ID )
136 REFERENCES R e g r e s s i o n L e v e l ( RegLevel ID )
137 ON UPDATE CASCADE
138 ON DELETE CASCADE,
139 CONSTRAINT Req2TCS C dependency FOREIGN KEY (C)
140 REFERENCES S e c u r i t y L e v e l ( SecLeve l ID )
141 ON UPDATE CASCADE
142 ON DELETE CASCADE,
143 CONSTRAINT Req2TCS I dependency FOREIGN KEY ( I )
144 REFERENCES S e c u r i t y L e v e l ( SecLeve l ID )
145 ON UPDATE CASCADE
146 ON DELETE CASCADE,
147 CONSTRAINT Req2TCS A dependency FOREIGN KEY (A)
148 REFERENCES S e c u r i t y L e v e l ( SecLeve l ID )
149 ON UPDATE CASCADE
150 ON DELETE CASCADE
151 )ENGINE=INNODB;
152
153 CREATE TABLE TCS2ATC (
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154 TCS ID VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) NOT NULL,
155 ATC ID VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) NOT NULL,
156 PRIMARY KEY ( TCS ID , ATC ID ) ,
157 CONSTRAINT TCS2ATC TCS dependency FOREIGN KEY ( TCS ID )
158 REFERENCES T e s t C a s e S p e c i f i c a t i o n ( TCS ID )
159 ON UPDATE CASCADE
160 ON DELETE CASCADE,
161 CONSTRAINT TCS2ATC ATC dependency FOREIGN KEY ( ATC ID )
162 REFERENCES AtomicTes tCase ( ATC ID )
163 ON UPDATE CASCADE
164 ON DELETE CASCADE
165 )ENGINE=INNODB;
166
167 CREATE TABLE C o n d u c t e d T e s t s (
168 CT ID VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) PRIMARY KEY,
169 ATC ID VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) ,
170 TCS ID VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) ,
171 Req ID VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) ,
172 C VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) ,
173 I VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) ,
174 A VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) ,
175 RegLevel ID VARCHAR( 2 5 5 ) ,
176 S u c c e s s BOOLEAN NOT NULL,
177 F a i l u r e R e a s o n TEXT,
178 Descr TEXT,
179 Time TIME ,
180 C o s t s INTEGER ,
181 CONSTRAINT ConductedTests Req2TCS FOREIGN KEY ( TCS ID , Req ID ,
182 C , I , A, RegLevel ID )
183 REFERENCES Req2TCS ( TCS ID , Req ID , C , I , A,
184 RegLevel ID )
185 ON UPDATE CASCADE
186 ON DELETE CASCADE,
187 CONSTRAINT ConductedTests ATC FOREIGN KEY ( ATC ID )
188 REFERENCES AtomicTes tCase ( ATC ID )
189 ON UPDATE CASCADE
190 ON DELETE CASCADE
191 )ENGINE=INNODB;

Appendix B
Functional Security Test Cases
B.1 CA0 - Authentication
Everything what authenticates belongs to this category
B.1.1 ME0 - One factor
Secret (e.g. password) is stored or transmitted in clear text. Default vendor
passwords must never be used. Should not be used for new systems, only
described for legacy systems. No matching requirement for ME0
B.1.2 ME1 - One factor
Secret (e.g. password) is NEITHER stored NOR transmitted in clear text.
Default vendor passwords must never be used. Quality of passwords or other
factors must be assured, e.g by using a policy that describes quality require-
ments. After a pre-determined number of logon attempts a user account the
account is locked. A locked account requires the user to take action to enable
an unlocked account or the account is unlocked after a time period (delay
mechanisms).
B.1.2.1 RQ0 - Standard one factor authentication
Password, pin, etc.
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• TCS0 - Basic one factor authentication: Tests if the one factor (e.g
password) authentication works properly on a very basic level
ATC0 - Generic one factor authentication test This test assures that the
authentication mechanism works correct on a basic level and only al-
lows correct authorized users to access the system
• TCS1 - Advanced one factor authentication: Tests if the one factor
(e.g password) authentication works properly on an advanced level
ATC1 - Secret change This test assures that the mechanism works cor-
rect in case of wrong login attempts and weak secret changes
ATC2 - Boundary test This test assures that the mechanism works cor-
rect on its boundarys and slightly beyond/beneath them
ATC7 - Authentication Robustness This test assures that the authenti-
cation mechanism does not fail when used outside its specification
B.1.3 ME2 - One factor strong authentication
One factor authentication where the secret is not repeated, i.e a new secret is
generated for each session. For example a cryptographic challenge response
mechanism (one time passwprd-OTP) or certificate, without PIN.
B.1.3.1 RQ1 - Strong one factor authentication
One time password, challenge response, certificates, etc.
• TCS3 - Strong one factor authentication: Test for the correct imple-
mentation of one-time, cryprographic and challenge-response authenti-
cation
ATC1 - Secret change This test assures that the mechanism works cor-
rect in case of wrong login attempts and weak secret changes
ATC2 - Boundary test This test assures that the mechanism works cor-
rect on its boundarys and slightly beyond/beneath them
ATC3 - Authentication Logging This test assures that authentication
activities are logged
ATC0 - Generic one factor authentication test This test assures that
the authentication mechanism works correct on a basic level and
only allows correct authorized users to access the system
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ATC4 - Challenge response, certificate and one time password This test
assures that challenge response and one time passwords can not be
reused and Certificates must be valid
ATC7 - Authentication Robustness This test assures that the authenti-
cation mechanism does not fail when used outside its specification
B.1.4 ME3 - Two factor strong authentication without a seperate
physical token
For example a cryptographic challenge response mechanism or PC based
certificates, protected by PIN.
B.1.4.1 RQ2 - Two factor authentication
Combination of one time password, challenge response, certificates, pin,
password etc.
• TCS4 - Two factor authentication: Test for the correct implementation
of one-time, cryprographic and challenge-response authentication
ATC5 - Two factor authentication Test checks if a two factor authenti-
cation works correct
ATC1 - Secret change This test assures that the mechanism works
correct in case of wrong login attempts and weak secret changes
ATC2 - Boundary test This test assures that the mechanism works
correct on its boundarys and slightly beyond/beneath them
ATC3 - Authentication Logging This test assures that authentica-
tion activities are logged
ATC4 - Challenge response, certificate and one time password This
test assures that challenge response and one time passwords can not
be reused and Certificates must be valid
ATC7 - Authentication Robustness This test assures that the authenti-
cation mechanism does not fail when used outside its specification
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B.1.5 ME4 - Two factor strong authentication with seperate
physical token
At least one of the factors must be a seperated physical token. For exam-
ple using a physial OTP password generator (with PIN protection) which
generates one time passwords.
B.1.5.1 RQ3 - Physical two factor authentication
Combination of one time password, challenge response, certificates, pin,
password etc. One factor must be physical (e.g token)
• TCS5 - Physical two factor authentication: Test for the correct imple-
mentation of one-time, cryprographic and challenge-response authenti-
cation, where one of the factors must be a physical token
ATC2 - Boundary test This test assures that the mechanism works cor-
rect on its boundarys and slightly beyond/beneath them
ATC3 - Authentication Logging This test assures that authentication
activities are logged
ATC0 - Generic one factor authentication test This test assures that
the authentication mechanism works correct on a basic level and
only allows correct authorized users to access the system
ATC6 - Physical two factor authentication Test checks if a physical two
factor authentication works correct
ATC5 - Two factor authentication Test checks if a two factor au-
thentication works correct
ATC7 - Authentication Robustness This test assures that the authenti-
cation mechanism does not fail when used outside its specification
B.2 Further categories
Due to security concerns just one example category is shown directly in this
work. For an overview of the content of all categories please contact:
Albin Zuccato, PhD.
TeliaSonera Sweden
SE-123 86 Farsta, Sweden
Zusammenfassung  
Funktionale Sicherheits- Tests können verwendet werden um sicherzustellen, 
dass die spezifizierte Sicherheitsfunktionalität korrekt funktioniert. Dabei 
liegt der Fokus nicht auf einem bösartigen Angriff auf das System, sondern 
auf der Erkenntnis, dass bestimmten Funktionen und Mechanismen vertraut 
werden kann. In dieser Arbeit präsentieren wir einen Ansatz für die 
Organisation und strukturierte Durchführung funktionaler Sicherheits- Tests.  
Dieser Ansatz ist flexibel gestaltet, und kann weiters für verschiedene und 
heterogene Systeme eingesetzt werden. Zusätzlich ist der in dieser Arbeit 
präsentierte Ansatz erweiterbar, so dass er an die spezifischen Bedürfnisse 
der Organisation und ihre Systeme angepasst werden kann. Um die 
grundlegende Praktikabilität der theoretischen Konzepte zu demonstrieren, 
präsentieren wir rudimentäre quantitative Daten für das Konzept. Diese erste 
Überprüfung ist notwendig, um die theoretischen Konzepte in der Praxis 
greifbar zu machen. Der Ansatz enthält eine Struktur, die Richtlinien und 
Vorgaben für die Erweiterung der Inhalte durch die Entwicklung von 
quantitativen Testdaten bietet. Dies ist eine Notwendigkeit auf Grund der 
Sensibilität dieser Aufgabe und der angenommenen Häufigkeit dieser 
Tätigkeit durch die Anpassung des Ansatzes an die spezifischen Bedürfnisse 
der einsetzenden Organisation. 
Zur Bewertung der Validität und der praktischen Anwendbarkeit des 
Ansatzes  wird eine Validierung durchgeführt. Diese ist in drei Stufen 
aufgebaut. Am Anfang zeigen wir eine Validierung der theoretischen 
Konzepte in Bezug auf die Konformität zu den Common Criterias [ISO07] 
und die Einhaltung anderer einschlägiger Normen und bewährter Praktiken. 
Anschließend demonstrieren wir die Vollständigkeit der Tests durch eine 
Überprüfung der Abdeckung der quantitativen Testdaten im Verhältnis zu 
den überprüfenden Sicherheitsfunktionen und Mechanismen. Als letzten Teil 
der Validierung, zeigen wir die Anwendbarkeit des Ansatzes in einem realen 
Projekt. 
Zusammengefasst kann gesagt werden, dass diese Arbeit eine ganzheitliche 
Betrachtung von funktionalen Sicherheits- Tests bietet und einen flexiblen 
und erweiterbaren Ansatz für die Durchführung und Organisation solcher 
präsentiert. 
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